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ABSTRACT 
Corporate Sustainability: The Impact of Corporate Leadership Gender On Year-Over-Year 
Performance 
by 
Jennoa R. Graham, PhD  
May 2019 
Chair: Danny Bellenger 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
Women continue to be underrepresented in corporate leadership positions in the global 
market. There has been limited research on the impact of female leaders’ influence on corporate 
sustainability over time. This paper contributes to the literature addressing leaders’ gender, 
corporate sustainability, and business ethics. Previous scholars have suggested the long-term 
effectiveness of corporate sustainability improves when females are in corporate leadership 
positions because of gender diﬀerences in business strategy and ethical considerations influenced 
by social roles. In this quantitative study, the relationships between corporate leaders’ gender and 
their companies’ financial, environmental, social, and governance performance over 4 years were 
examined. Such an examination of how leaders’ genders influence financial and nonfinancial 
constructs is unprecedented in a single study. In this research, I also introduce a paradigm shift in 
defining and analyzing corporate sustainability constructs to create a holistic view of equal 
consideration of financial and nonfinancial performance. The evidence suggests the impact of 
female leaders on year-over-year sustainability is significantly greater than that of their male 
counterparts across several performance outcomes, industries, and time periods. Due to the small 
sample size, the effect is small; however, enough information is available to successfully test 
 x 
hypotheses with the proposed holistic approach. The results indicate that corporate sustainability 
is an area of competitive advantage for female leaders in multinational corporations and other 
large corporations. Future longitudinal research opportunities focusing on female leadership and 
corporate sustainability performance in the global market are needed and encouraged. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Leadership Gender, Corporate Sustainability, CSR, Business Ethics 
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide, there are limited opportunities for women to advance to corporate leadership 
positions in multinational corporations and other large corporations. Such large corporations 
have the power, people, and resources to significantly impact global and domestic economic 
systems. To have a positive impact on economic systems, more leaders and more positive results 
are needed. Chasan (2015) stated, 
If a corporation is run by ethical, equitable, socially responsible and environmentally 
conscious management with a highly functional governance structure for eco-social 
benefit, and is supported by like-minded shareholders and customers, a corporation can 
do great good in the world. (p. 1) 
The results in the existing literature indicate that corporate sustainability could be an area in 
which female corporate leaders are advantaged over their male peers.  
Corporate sustainability, also known as sustainable development, was defined by the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) as a corporation’s ability 
to meet business needs “without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (p. 43). Sustainability is a continuous process analyzing the performance outcomes 
of economic, environmental, and social business activities over time (Elkington, 1997; Gao, 
2008; Müller & Pfleger, 2014; Wu, He, & Duan, 2013). The interpretation and application of 
sustainability has changed over the years due to perception (Carroll, Lipartito, Post, & Werhane, 
2012; Shaw, Nemer, Vail, & Gamer, 2012; Wang, 2015), but the foundational concept remains 
unchanged. To build trust and brand equity in their communities, corporations must consider the 
consequences of tomorrow for business activities conducted today. 
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Corporations must establish trust in their communities of operations to achieve long-term 
business sustainability (Idowu & Louche, 2011). Establishing trust means proving the ability to 
interact responsibly with people and the local and global environments. Responsible interactions 
will increase brand equity over time. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a business strategy 
designed to incorporate economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic activities into the business’s 
vision (Geva, 2008; Müller & Pfleger, 2014). It is the means to establish corporate sustainability. 
Carroll (1979) defined CSR as the corporation’s inclusion of societal expectations into 
economic, legal, and ethical considerations at a given point in time. The current study defines 
CSR as an overarching principle aligning strategic business activities with society’s expectations 
to conduct a profitable yet ethically considerate business (Brusseau, 2017). These activities 
provide performance outcomes CEOs can track, measure, and analyze to increase brand equity, 
build trust, and improve leaders’ effectiveness. As primary leaders, CEOs are responsible for 
influencing the corporation’s direction and ultimately the quality of its interactions with people 
and the environment (Elsaid, 2014; Glick, 2011). 
The evidence suggests that men and women influence corporations in different ways and 
for different reasons. According to Glass, Cook, and Ingersoll (2016), female leaders are more 
focused on obtaining long-term results by building relationships and strengthening the 
community, and male leaders are focused on short-term financial gains. Building relationships is 
key to establishing trust and interacting responsibly with the community. The underlying reasons 
females are more focused on relationships and community are not definitive; however, the 
reviewed literature offered three suggestions. 
The first reason is female leaders demonstrate communal characteristics, such as 
nurturing, caring, and sensitivity, resulting in a positive influence on corporation performance 
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and overall board effectiveness (Green & Cassell, 1996; Mattis, 1993). Communal characteristics 
positively influence relationship building and trust by generating a sense of togetherness and 
holistic well-being for all stakeholders. Female leaders are also given professional 
encouragement to continue behaviors producing successful outcomes. Per Gilligan (1982), the 
second reason is that communal behavior is based on socialization, which indicates that a given 
behavior is expected and rewarded accordingly. Rewards for behaving as expected can include 
recognition, promotion, or general acceptance. 
A third reason could be professional contribution. Females are more likely to hold 
leadership positions in nonprofit and service organizations contributing to a focus on community 
(Glass et al., 2016; Hillman A, Cannella A Jr, & I, 2002; Singh V, Terjesen S, & S., 2008) and 
philanthropy (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994; Konadu, 2017). Burke (1993) found that, in Fortune 
500 companies, 20% of female directors had previous service experience in some type of social 
service organization, including foundations. Burke also noted relatively high female 
representation in public-policy and CSR committees, which are formed to promote long-term 
sustainability. 
The evidence presented suggested that female leaders actively engage in the community 
to build long-term relationships and secure stakeholders more often than male leaders do. The 
primary purpose of this study is to answer research questions addressing the effectiveness of 
female corporate leaders on performance outcomes supporting sustainability. Female leaders are 
women who hold the job title of any position in the C-suite (e.g., CEO, CFO, COO) or on the 
board of directors. According to the 2014 Accenture study, “female CEOs continue to be 
underrepresented among the global business community” (p. 1).  
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Although the number of female CEOs is small compared to the number of their male 
counterparts (Catalyst, 2016; Hernandez Bark, Escartín, Schuh, & van Dick, 2015; Kim & 
Starks, 2016; Vanderbroeck, 2010), current research efforts must continue to provide visibility of 
their contribution to executive leadership (Adler, 1997; Bunch, 1991). This study’s research 
questions are designed to add to the body of knowledge of historical literature on leadership 
gender by providing additional visibility of the support to increase the number women in 
corporate leadership positions in multinational and large corporations. Aspiring female corporate 
leaders may leverage effective business strategies, such as CSR, to promote long-term business 
(corporate) sustainability and compete in the global business market. 
In the context of the study, corporate sustainability is a performance outcome of the 
overarching principle of CSR, which provides the guiding principles on how to conduct business 
responsibly at a given point of time, and corporate sustainability provides the ongoing check-
and-balance process to ensure the long-term vision is met and no harm comes to future 
generations. Aspiring female corporate leaders understanding CSR balance may be competitively 
positioned to increase brand equity, build trust, and improve leaders’ effectiveness. Although 
men greatly outnumber women in leadership positions, the universal relationship between 
leaders’ gender and effectiveness remains ambiguous.  
Some scholars have indicated that gender alone has no practical influence on leaders’ 
effectiveness (Butterfield & Grinnell, 1999; Eagly & Jahannesen-Schmidt, 2007; Hoffman, 
2013; Jonsen, Maznevski, & Schneider, 2010; Vecchio, 2003). Others have included factors such 
as personality traits (Bass, 1990), leadership styles (Eagly & Jahannesen-Schmidt, 2007), ethical 
sensitivity (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Ho, Li, Tam, & Zhang, 2014), and social behaviors (Esser, 
Kahrens, Mouzughi, & Eomois, 2018) in the analysis. In the past, researchers found that 
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leadership gender studies are inconsistent across time, cultures, and organizational circumstances 
(Butterfield & Grinnell, 1999; Jonsen et al., 2010), but more recent scholars have focused on 
firm performance, with gender as a significant influence (Jalbert, Jalbert, & Furumo, 2013; Khan 
& Vieito, 2013; Na, 2017). Such contradictory ideas can be frustrating for researchers who are 
unfamiliar with gender studies. 
The current study also proposes four additional goals subsequent to the primary focus, 
which will be introduced and discussed as appropriate. The first of those goals is to present a 
concise literature review on the history, purpose, and value of corporate sustainability. Due to the 
abundance of literature, it is necessary to streamline foundational information for clarity. The 
literature review also shows financial sustainability performance outcomes are typically analyzed 
separately from environmental, social, and governance outcomes, also known as ESG 
performance (RobecoSAM, 2016). The impact of CEOs’, C-suites’, and board of directors 
members’ genders on year-over-year sustainability performance outcomes (financial, 
environmental, social, governance, and overall sustainability ranking) will be presented in a 
primary model for analysis (Figure 1a).  
Performance outcomes are categorized according to stakeholder value to receive equal 
consideration, creating a holistic view of sustainability (Figure 1b). Chapter 2 provides more 
detail on categorizing constructs according to stakeholder value (investor value and community 
welfare) in preparation for a holistic analysis of sustainability. The holistic concentric circles 
model is an innovative combination of the original pyramid model presented by founding 
corporate sustainability theorist Archie B. Carroll (1991) and the 1971 concentric circles notion 
presented by the WCED (Crane, McWilliams, Matten, Moon, & Siegel, 2008). Chapter 2 also 
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provides details on the holistic concentric circles model, pyramid model, and concentric circles 
notion with illustrations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1A 
 
Figure 1B 
Figure 1. Corporate leadership gender impact on year-over-year corporate sustainability 
(1A) and Performance outcomes categorized by stakeholder value (1B). Stakeholder value, 
investor value, and community-welfare interest. CSRO = overall corporate social 
responsibility. 
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The impact of corporate leaders’ gender will be demonstrated within the frameworks of 
the upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007) and social role theory (Koenig & Eagly, 2014). The 
upper echelons theory will demonstrate how personal perceptions of corporate leaders influence 
corporate performance. The social roles theory as applied to sustainability will explain how 
gender-role stereotypes influence corporate performance. The resulting year-over-year analysis 
will incorporate financial and nonfinancial constructs and provide meaningful contributions to 
previous studies on leaders’ gender, corporate sustainability, and business ethics. The tools used 
to measure annual sustainability performance begin with an assessment of data collected by 
RobecoSAM (2016).  
The Corporate Sustainability Assessment (CSA) is an industry-trusted tool used to collect 
data from over 3,400 multinational and large publicly traded companies. RobecoSAM used the 
CSA to assign a score to each performance and released the information to approve sources for 
research and analysis purposes. One organization listed as an approved source is S&P Dow Jones 
Indices, LLC, a joint venture corporation providing global financial market indices to industry 
professionals (S&P_Dow_Jones_Indices, 2018). The Dow Jones runs a proprietary rule-based 
ranking algorithm on the CSA sustainability scores to calculate the “top 10% most sustainable 
market caps per industry” (RobecoSAM, 2016). Dow Jones scores are then published with 
Bloomberg, LP, a privately held financial, software, data, and media company headquartered in 
New York City (Bloomberg_L.P., 2018). 
A second example of an approved source is Sustainalytics, a privately held financial 
services company headquartered in Amsterdam (2018). As a trusted partner of Dow Jones since 
2000 and Bloomberg, LP since 2014, Sustainalytics remains a reputable resource for analyzing 
and publishing sustainability scores. Sustainalytics scores are created by running a proprietary 
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asset-weighted ranking algorithm on 70 factors by level of importance and industry peers (Hale, 
2016). Although Dow Jones and Sustainalytics analyze the same data, their methodologies are 
different. In the next section, I provide background on corporate social responsibility and 
affiliated theories for performance construct development. 
 Background 
The first goal of this study is to provide a concise literature review illustrating the 
progressive position of corporate sustainability. The topic has been evolving for over 80 years, 
and the vast amount of literature is interpreted based on perception and application. See 
Appendix A for related topics and definitions. The background presented in the current section 
will provide the content structure needed for the review of sustainability literature presented in 
Chapter 2. To successfully implement corporate sustainability or transformation, the entire 
organization must transform core operational processes and human-resource interaction 
(Borland, 2009; Droll, 2013; Muja, Appelbaum, Walker, Ramadan, & Sodeyi, 2014). 
Transformation begins with a unified acceptance of corporate social responsibility strategy into 
everyday business operations. Leaders must champion the strategy and push the ideology 
throughout the entire corporation. 
The concept of CSR is an overarching principle used as a guideline for conducting a 
profitable yet ethically considerate business (Brusseau, 2017). A corporation’s actions today 
must consider the consequences of tomorrow. Consequences refer to the intentional or 
unintentional results of interactions with surrounding people and the environment. The purpose 
of CSR is to minimize negative consequences by showing a corporation understands the needs of 
stakeholders (customers, shareholders, suppliers, employees, and the surrounding community) 
through responsible interactions. Carroll et al. (2012) stated that corporations must integrate 
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social concerns into their vision, governance, and daily operations to be successful. Integrating 
social concerns in key areas promotes responsible interactions in overall business operations to 
build brand equity, establish trust, and improve leaders’ effectiveness. 
Corporations must also consider the impact of decisions and actions on internal and 
external operations. Internal operations refers to a corporation’s daily business cycle. Employees 
put in the labor required to complete daily operational tasks. Decisions or actions impacting the 
fair treatment of employees must be considered. Employees maintaining a negative view of the 
corporation may interrupt or even stop business operations (e.g., with a union strike). External 
operations refers to a corporation’s public image or brand and the actions taken to protect it. To 
maintain a positive public image, a corporation may incur higher production costs to avoid harm 
to nearby communities.  
CSR is the driving strategy producing outcomes (decisions or actions) considering 
stakeholders, operational impacts, and future generations. As an overarching principle covering a 
vast number of responsibilities, CSR led to multiple theories further narrowed over time. Three 
primary theories are now used to create practical operational actions for sustainability 
measurement. The first theory, the stakeholder theory, states corporations must create value for 
stakeholders and build strong relationships (Freeman & Dmytriyev, 2017). Strong relationships 
give stakeholders an influential voice in the actions or decisions the corporation makes.  
In a normative application, stakeholder theory interprets the moral and philosophical 
guidelines for practical actions in a corporation’s operations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
Practical actions are developed and measured according to corporate goals and the identified 
stakeholders for corporate goals (Crane et al., 2008). The second theory, the triple bottom line 
(TBL) theory, states corporations must create value for investors by being profitable, socially 
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conscious, and environmentally protective (Hammer, 2015; Jeurissen, 2000). TBL theory is 
financially driven so as to attract and retain long-term investors. Practical actions are developed 
according to three performance constructs: financial, social, and environmental (Elkington, 1997; 
Gao, 2008).  
The third theory, the CSR theory, tends to cause confusion because it carries the same 
title as the overarching principle of CSR strategy. The CSR theory states corporations must make 
profits while positively contributing to the welfare of local and global communities (Idowu & 
Louche, 2011). The profit and welfare position of CSR theory differs from the other two theories 
because the position is driven by morality to demonstrate a corporate consciousness and not 
specifically to create value. Practical actions for CSR theory are developed according to four 
nonfinancial constructs: environmental, legal, ethical, and philanthropic (Brusseau, 2017). 
Philanthropy is considered a social construct, and legal and ethical constructs are grouped 
together under governance. The result is referred to as ESG performance, which contains three 
constructs: environmental, social, and governance.  
According to Shaw et al. (2012), to achieve the WCED’s definition of corporate 
sustainability of meeting business needs today without sabotaging future generational needs, 
corporate leaders must gain a holistic understanding of the interconnection between society, 
economy, and ecology (p. 40). The second goal of this study is to include concepts from each of 
the three primary theories, stakeholder value creation (stakeholder theory), investor value 
creation (TBL theory), and community welfare (CSR theory), to build a holistic view of 
corporate sustainability. Financial and governance constructs determine investor value creation, 
and environmental and social constructs determine community welfare. Local vs. global 
participation in community welfare is based on overall CSR strategy. 
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All four constructs (financial, environmental, social, and governance) are analyzed to 
achieve stakeholder value through overall corporate sustainability performance. Analysis of 
corporate sustainability results may be used to modify a corporation’s overall CSR strategy and 
related business activities according to long-term goals. Corporate leaders must leverage 
analytical results and their position of power to make decisions that increase effectiveness of 
corporate sustainability (Li, Li, & Minor, 2016). Due to the level of community consideration, 
sustainability is considered an area of opportunity for aspiring female corporate leaders to gain a 
competitive advantage in a male-dominated global business market. 
 Statement of the Problem 
Corporate sustainability has been an ever-evolving topic of interest since the earliest 
discussions of corporate social responsibility in the 1930s (Carroll et al., 2012; Shaw et al., 2012; 
Wang, 2015). Aspiring female corporate leaders seeking to compete in a male-dominated global 
market must know corporate sustainability is an ongoing process and understand how their 
decisions impact effectiveness year-over-year (Marshall & Hopfl, 2007; Müller & Pfleger, 2014; 
Ribera, 2010). As of October 2016, the proportion of female CEOs representing Fortune 500 
companies has held steady at 4% since 2011 (Javidan, Bullough, & Dibble, 2016). A higher 
percentage of corporations may have more opportunities for women on their board of directors.  
Current research examining female leaders’ influence on corporate sustainability over 
time is limited. Prior leadership gender studies addressed CEOs and boards of directors’ impacts 
on financial performance (Feng, Wang, & Kreuze, 2017; Ho et al., 2014; Jalbert et al., 2013; 
Ribera, 2010; Roberts, 2017; Tay, 2019), overall corporation performance (Khan & Vieito, 
2013), and leadership characteristics (Hoffman, 2013). The results of those studies show the need 
for more women in leadership positions, and current legislation is helping expedite the process. 
 12 
On September 5, 2018, the state of California enacted Senate Bill 826 Sections 301.3 and 2115., 
which mandates more females in the boardroom (SB-826_Corporations, 2018): 
This bill, no later than the close of the 2019 calendar year, would require a domestic 
general corporation or foreign corporation that is a publicly held corporation, as defined, 
whose principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are 
located in California to have a minimum of one female, as defined, on its board of 
directors, as specified. No later than the close of the 2021 calendar year, the bill would 
increase that required minimum number to 2 female directors if the corporation has 5 
directors or to 3 female directors if the corporation has 6 or more directors. (p. 2) 
This study will analyze the impact of corporate leadership gender on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability performance outcomes and contribute to previous leadership gender 
studies. In the next section, I provide an overview of the framework used to construct the 
analysis around solving a gender-centric problem. 
 Framework 
Although prior research has provided insights into the benefits of female leadership in 
financial and operational performance, it is necessary to increase the amount of empirical 
evidence for sustainability. The current study examines the relationships of corporate leadership 
gender and financial and nonfinancial (ESG) corporate sustainability performance outcomes. 
Female leadership refers to women who hold the job title of any C-suite position (e.g., the CEO, 
CFO, and COO) or board of director membership in a corporation. I used the theoretical 
frameworks of upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007) and social role theory (Koenig & Eagly, 
2014) for empirical evidence.  
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The upper echelons theory states organizational performance may be predicted partially 
by leaders’ perception of values. CEOs and executive leaders make decisions based on personal 
and professional experiences (demographic characteristics), influencing value creation, 
community welfare, and the actions producing corporate performance outcomes (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Nielsen, 2009). Social role theory states societal beliefs 
define acceptable gender roles (gender stereotypes) and assign value through the characteristics 
of the accepted roles. Eagly (1987) indicated that, if current gender-based behavior is consistent 
with previously observed gender-based behavior, observers are more likely to approve of the 
behavior.  
As mentioned previously, communal behavior is expected and accepted of female leaders 
and is prevalent in nonprofit service and philanthropy. Communal behavior crosses professional 
experience (upper echelons) and gender stereotypes (social role). This study tests the viability of 
decisions already in place. If previous empirical evidence presented in the upper echelons theory 
and the social role theory are sound, the study’s results will indicate differences in sustainability 
results when controlled for gender. 
The conceptual framework of the holistic concentric circles model is a four-point 
elliptical model creating a holistic view of financial and ESG performance constructs. The model 
uses the foundational concept of leveraging stakeholder values to assign equal consideration to 
all four constructs: finance, environmental, social, and governance. Chapter 2 addresses model 
origin, evolution, and application details. 
 Purpose 
The primary purpose of the research is to determine the impact of corporate leadership 
gender year-over-year corporate sustainability performance outcomes. As previously discussed, 
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limited research linked the long-term effectiveness of corporate leadership gender to corporate 
sustainability performance. The study will include a year-over-year quantitative analysis to 
determine relationships between corporate leadership gender, financial performance, 
environmental performance, social performance, and governance performance. Analysis results 
will be incorporated into the holistic concentric circles model to propose a holistic view of 
corporate sustainability performance. 
The following research questions and hypotheses are explored to achieve the objectives 
for the study. Research Question 1 is “What is the impact of CEO gender on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability in North American organizations?” For this question, I formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
• H1: CEO gender has a positive impact on year-over-year corporate sustainability. 
• H2: Female CEOs have a more positive impact than male CEOs on year-over-
year corporate sustainability. 
Research Question 2 is “What is the impact of C-suite gender on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability in North American organizations?” For this question, I formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
• H3: Female C-suite presence has a positive impact on year-over-year corporate 
sustainability. 
• H4: Female C-suites have a more positive impact than male C-suites on year-over-
year corporate sustainability. 
Research Question 3 is “What is the impact of female board members on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability in North American organizations?” For this question, I formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
• H5: Female board-member presence has a positive impact on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability. 
• H6: Female board-member presence has a more positive impact than male-only 
board-member presence on year-over-year corporate sustainability. 
• H7: A positive relationship exists between year-over-year firm performance and 
corporate sustainability. 
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The research questions are designed to add to the body of knowledge of historical 
literature on leadership gender. The first research question determines the impact of CEOs’ 
gender on year-over-year corporate sustainability. Hypothesis 1 assumes a relationship between 
CEO gender and corporate sustainability and that the relationship is positive over time. 
Hypothesis 2 states female CEOs are more impactful than their male peers over time.  
The second research question determines the impact of C-suite positions on year-over 
year-corporate sustainability. The definition of C-suite for the study is CEO, CFO, COO and 
other executive positions in the corporation. Hypothesis 3 concerns differences between the 
presence and absence of female C-suite representation. Hypothesis 4 claims females have more 
impact. The third research question determines the impact of female board members on year-
over-year corporate sustainability. Hypotheses 5 and 6 claim the same differences as Hypotheses 
3 and 4 and apply to them to board of director positions. Hypothesis 7 proposes a direct 
relationship between firm performance and corporate sustainability. In the next section, I explore 
why this study may be significant in improving the structure of corporate leadership such that 
companies can be more competitive in the global market. 
 Significance 
If the study’s results show the hypotheses are true, businesses may be encouraged to 
increase female presence in corporate leadership positions, and other states may proactively 
adopt California’s SB-826. This study’s third goal is to provide meaningful contributions to 
previous literature. Positive effects of corporate leaders’ gender would add to existing studies, 
providing evidence that female corporate leadership has a relatively strong positive influence on 
sustainability (Boulouta, 2012; Velte, 2016) and CSR strategy (Burges & Tharenou, 2002; Huse, 
 16 
Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009; Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994), as compared to the leadership of their 
male peers.  
This study is significant because it is the first to address corporate leaders’ gender across 
all executive positions and in relationship with year-over-year corporate sustainability. As a hot 
topic of diversity, gender studies are increasingly popular because of male-dominated presence 
leadership in the global business market (Adler, 1997; Chen, 2001; Hoffman, 2013; Marshall & 
Hopfl, 2007). Kapoor (2011) defined diversity as an avenue to provide opportunities for 
minorities and women in the workplace. Over time, the focus of diversity shifted from individual 
mindsets to a broader spectrum of organizational culture.  
According to studies conducted by Kapoor (2011), diversity has evolved from simply 
black vs. white and male vs. female to become inclusive of every way people can be different (p. 
286). As the primary decision makers, corporate leaders must be aware of employee differences 
and understand how to leverage diversity in the global business market. Studies have shown that 
women in general are globally not considered for international business management even 
though they may be more qualified than their male counterpart (Doerre, 2001; Hutchings, 
Metcalfe, & Cooper, 2010). The study may offer helpful information to tip the scales in favor of 
including more women in leadership. 
California’s Senate Bill 826 Sections 301.3 and 2115 references a series of studies, 
suggesting a significant number of publicly traded companies have no female presence on their 
boards of directors (SB-826_Corporations, 2018). Annalisa Barrett (2017), indicated 25% of 
publicly traded companies in the state of California have no female presence on their boards of 
directors. Accentuating the need for female board members, the bill also referenced a 6-year 
study from Credit Suisse (2012) providing evidence of the positive effect of female corporate 
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leadership on overall business performance. In the same study, the women outperformed the men 
by 26% in the global market: “Companies with three or more women in senior management 
functions score even more highly, on average, on the organizational performance profile, than 
companies with no women on boards or in the executive ranks” (SB-826_Corporations,2018,p. 
6). Corporate sustainability is included in overall trends of organizational performance.  
Corporate sustainability is a moving target that continues to define business models, 
strategy, business processes, and reporting structures (Klettner, Clarke, & Boersma, 2014) to 
achieve four known CSR benefits: cost reduction, competitive advantage, synergistic value 
creation, and trustworthy reputation (Crane et al., 2008). The preceding benefits are 
complimentary to the earlier mentioned goals of building brand equity, establishing trust, and 
improving leadership effectiveness. The study will attempt to show for the selected sample, 
corporate leadership gender has a direct impact on year-over-year corporate sustainability. The 
results are anticipated to achieve the study’s fourth goal, offering sustainability as an area of 
competitive advantage for aspiring female corporate leaders. I hope to start a new trend in global 
studies by focusing on female leadership and corporate sustainability performance over time. 
 Method Summary 
I conducted a quantitative analysis to determine the relationships between corporate 
leaders’ gender and year-over-year sustainability performance outcomes from 2014 to 2017. I 
selected a sample of 99 multinational (or otherwise large) corporations from the S&P 500 Dow 
Jones Sustainability North American Composite Index. The index represents the “top 20% of the 
largest 600 North American companies in the S&P Global BMI based on long-term economic, 
environmental and social criteria” (S&P Dow Jones, 2018). I retrieved the data for the selected 
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sample from Bloomberg, an approved source of RobecoSAM and a mutual third-party partner of 
Dow Jones and Sustainalytics.  
The hypotheses associated with the research questions examined corporate leadership 
impact at three levels—CEO, C-suite, and board of directors—moderated by the global industry 
classification standard (GICS), which contains eleven categories. 
GICS was developed in response to the global financial community’s need for one 
complete, consistent set of global sector and industry definitions, thereby enabling asset 
owners, asset managers and investment research specialists to make seamless company, 
sector, and industry comparisons across countries, regions, and globally. (RobecoSam, 
2016) 
The independent variable is CEO gender, utilizing a dummy variable of 1 for female and 
0 for male. The other independent variables, C-suite and board of directors are represented by the 
number of people in the positions and the percentage of representation. The four dependent 
variables—governance, environmental, social, and financial—will be tested along with overall 
sustainability ranking (Table 1). Additional metrics such as q ratio (overall investment value) and 
z score (overall investment risk) add value to the holistic perception of corporation health 
(Elsaid, 2014). I used a test of normality to determine the distribution of the data and so that I 
could choose between the parametric and nonparametric methods. The normality-test results 
indicate that the nonparametric method is the appropriate analytical approach.  
I used the Friedman test to determine the significant changes in the dependent variables 
from 2014 to 2017. I used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine the significant changes’ 
effect sizes and the Mann–Whitney U test to determine whether the significant changes crossed 
independent groups (e.g., CEO gender); I supplemented this with the mean and median scores 
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(H2). I used the Kruskal–Wallis test to determine differences across the C-suite and board of 
director groups (H4 and H6). The correlations, descriptive statistics, and other illustrative graphs 
provide evidence for the remaining hypotheses (H1, H3, H5, and H7).  
Table 1. Variables for Analysis 
Independent variables 
Gender Research Question Measurement 
CEO RQ1 Nominal 
C-suite  RQ2 Interval 
Board of directors RQ3 Interval 
Dependent variables  
Code Name Construct Measurement 
CGP Governance (percentile) Governance Ordinal 
CEP Environment (percentile) Environmental Ordinal 
CSP Social (percentile) Social Ordinal 
CSRO ESG (ranking) Overall ESG Ordinal 
ROE Return on equity Financial Ordinal 
ROIC Return on investment capital Financial Ordinal 
ROA Return on assets Financial Ordinal 
Profit Profit Financial Ordinal 
q ratio Investment value Firm performance Ordinal 
z score Investment risk Firm performance Ordinal 
Note. CGP = corporate governance performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CSP = 
corporate social performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall. 
 
 Assumptions and Limitations 
The first limitation is the sample, which is restricted to North American multinational 
corporations and other large corporations that participated in the CSA, which RobecoSAM 
conducted and reported in the S&P 500 Dow Jones Sustainability North American Composite 
Index for 2014 through 2017 (consecutively). To gain a holistic view of sustainability 
performance I selected outcomes from Dow Jones, Sustainalytics, and financial data from 
Bloomberg. The second limitation is the data reported through Bloomberg is contingent upon the 
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originating source’s completeness and timeliness. I assumed that the data collected for the full 
research period of 2013 to 2017 is complete as of July 7, 2018. 
The third limitation is the fact that the analysis methodology is unprecedented and is 
subject to heavy scrutiny. The literature review did not produce existing research addressing a 
holistic view of corporate leaders’ impact on financial, environmental, social, and governance 
performance outcomes of sustainability. In the future, it is uncertain whether the study will begin 
a new trend in global studies focusing on female leadership and corporate sustainability 
performance over time. 
 Organization 
Chapter 1 provides background and foundational information pertaining to the study, 
including statement of the problem, conceptual framework, and other relevant details. Chapter 2 
presents a concise literature review on the progressive position of corporate sustainability by 
illustrating its history, purpose, and value over time. Key concepts, models, and definitions 
presented in the previous chapter will be thoroughly discussed. Chapter 3 provides intricate 
detail on the data source, reporting structure, and analysis methodology for the study. Chapter 4 
presents study results, and Chapter 5 discusses theoretical and managerial implications.  
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 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research’s primary purpose is to determine corporate leadership gender’s impact on 
yearly financial and nonfinancial (ESG) corporate sustainability performance outcomes. The first 
goal of this study is to provide a literature review presenting a concise depiction of the history, 
the purpose, and the value of corporate sustainability. To achieve this goal, the depiction begins 
with a closer look at the origin of corporate social responsibility. 
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as an overarching principle that aligns 
strategic business activities with society’s expectations to conduct a profitable yet ethically 
considerate business (Brusseau, 2017). Society expectations represent positive or negative 
perceptions of business activities implemented during a given period. Over time, increasingly 
positive perceptions of a corporation will drive society’s expectations higher (Poolthong & 
Mandhachitara, 2009). The expectation of mutual benefit for the society and the corporation is 
considered a contract. 
In earlier definitions of CSR, scholars were more focused on managing the needs and 
perceptions of society and stakeholders, and they gave less consideration to profit (Bendell, 
2009; Carroll, 1979). As part of a 6-decade analysis, Rahman (2011) and Dahlsrud (2008) 
discovered that historical definitions of CSR shifted according to the dynamics (needs) related to 
social welfare and the environment during a given period. The time progression in Table 2 shows 
the definitions provided by prominent scholars evolving from a philanthropic doctrine to a long-
term vision of resource sharing and conservation. 
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Table 2. CSR Defined by Prominent Scholars 
Name Year Definition 
Howard Bowen 1953 
The CEO is obligated to pursue policies, decisions, and actions that meet 
desirable societal objectives and values. 
Morrell Heald 1957 
The CEO is obligated to implement humane and constructive social 
policies. 
Keith Davis 1960 
The CEO’s decisions and actions must go beyond the corporation’s direct 
economic or technical interest. 
William C. Frederick 1960 
The CEO implements an economic system that meets society’s 
expectations by employing business activities to enhance total 
socioeconomic welfare. 
Clarence Walton 1967 
The intimate relationship between corporations and society must be 
preserved via pursuits to achieve prospective goals. 
Milton Friedman 1970 The CEO should maximize profits without deception or fraud. 
Archie B. Carroll 1979 
The CEO includes society’s expectations in economic, legal, and ethical 
considerations at a given point of time. 
Thomas M. Jones 1980 
Corporations are obligated to constituent groups beyond traditional and 
societal groups (e.g., national and global). 
Note. Adapted from “Evaluation of Definitions: Ten Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility,” by S. Rahman, World 
Review of Business Research, 1(1), p. 167-169. Copyright 2011 by Macquarie University. Adapted with permission. 
 
CSR was born from early 19th-century U.S. ideals of philanthropy and fraternity 
reinforced by Christian views of humanitarianism (Heald, 1970). Christianity provided the 
United States with virtues and values needed to create a foundational sense of common good for 
society. During an industrial revolution, corporations created a sense of common good for local 
communities by focusing on internal business operations such as employee welfare, labor 
conditions, and compensation, resulting in increased productivity and profits (Brusseau, 2017; 
Crane et al., 2008; Heald, 1970; Kotler & Lee, 2005). The success of internal operations 
expanded to external concerns such as public health, education, and clean environments (Carroll 
et al., 2012). 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, community welfare and social programs began to fuel 
philanthropy across the country. Hospital clinics, educational institution endowments, 
neighborhood recreation centers (e.g., Young Men’s Christian Association), and self-contained 
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communities (e.g., the Pullman experiment) were heavily influenced by society’s perceptions of 
corporations (Crane et al., 2008). Such bold social initiatives led to the Community Chest 
Movement, an early form of CSR in which corporations received regular education on social 
problems and on how agencies address community concerns (Crane et al., 2008, p. 22–23).  
As corporations became educated on social issues, corporate leadership became more 
aware and more connected with the community. The new connectivity between corporations and 
communities increased philanthropic opportunities, paved the way for analyzing the root cause 
of social distress, and increased corporations’ local footprints (Heald, 1970). Corporations’ 
engagement with communities shifted from a reactive position of donating time and resources to 
a proactive position of prevention and problem solving. As more resources were allocated to new 
initiatives, corporate leaders determined an urgent need to find ways to balance society’s 
expectations with profitability goals (Elkington, 1997; Gao, 2008). The search for balance 
provided the foundation for TBL theory.  
TBL theory, one of the three primary CSR theories, states that corporations must create 
value for long-term investors by being profitable, socially conscious, and environmentally 
protective (Hammer, 2015; Jeurissen, 2000). Corporate leaders develop practical actions 
according to three performance constructs: financial, environmental, and social (Elkington, 1997; 
Gao, 2008). Scholars such as Friedman (1970) and Arrow (1985) have critiqued the 
philanthropic foundations of CSR and only support strategies focused on maximizing profits and 
meeting shareholder desires. Their argument indicates that the CEO represents the corporation, 
and CSR initiatives should not impede core business goals (profits).  
Stakeholder theory, another primary CSR theory, interprets the moral and philosophical 
guidelines for practical actions in corporation operations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Earning 
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profits while violating moral and philosophical guidelines requires deliberate consideration. 
Practical actions are developed and measured according to corporate goals and identified 
stakeholders (Crane et al., 2008). Despite scholarly critiques, societal expectations remained a 
prominent consideration in CSR initiatives well into the next century.  
During the middle to late 1900s, corporations began focusing on large high-profile social 
issues beyond the local community. The intention of this shift was to find scalable ways to 
significantly impact society while maintaining financial stability. Participating in high-profile 
causes can provide opportunities to increase positive perceptions of the corporation, strengthen 
financial performance, and gain access to new markets (Bendell, 2009). Pollution, racism, and 
poverty are large-scale issues that are addressed on regional levels and that when addressed 
transcend the global market (Crane et al., 2008).  
As corporations began expanding international operations in the late 1900s and beyond, 
community welfare, employee welfare, and environmental issues were evident. In developing 
countries, CEOs discovered impoverished communities, cheap labor, and abundant natural 
resources. Economic, legal, and political conditions were also vastly different than in the United 
States, allowing room for individual interpretations of processes, unregulated business activities, 
corporate greed, and scandals (Shaw et al., 2012).  
To protect the interests of developing countries and to regulate the business behaviors of 
multinational corporations, companies have introduced a CSR business strategy for pursuing new 
markets (Allouche, 2006). These corporations’ shift from a reactive position of donating time 
and resources to a proactive position of global prevention and problem solving provided the 
foundation for CSR theory. As the third primary theory of CSR strategy, corporations must make 
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a profit while positively contributing to the welfare of local and global communities (Idowu & 
Louche, 2011).  
Profit and welfare positions are driven by morality to demonstrate a corporate 
consciousness and ultimately increase community value. Practical actions for CSR theory are 
developed according to four nonfinancial constructs: environmental, legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic (Brusseau, 2017). Philanthropy is a social construct, and legal and ethical 
constructs are grouped together under governance. The result is ESG performance containing 
three constructs: environmental, social, and governance. 
This study proposes to include the concepts of stakeholder value creation, investor value 
creation, and local and global community welfare from the three primary CSR strategy theories 
to build a holistic view of corporate sustainability. CSR strategy provides the guiding principles, 
while corporate sustainability ensures business longevity and generational security. 
 Corporate Sustainability 
Corporate sustainability has multiple definitions, ranging from very broad to very specific 
depending on the context framework, the historical period, and the scholar of reference (Rezaee, 
2016). Sustainability is a moving target that continues to define business models, strategies, 
business processes, and reporting structures (Klettner et al., 2014) to achieve four CSR benefits: 
cost reduction, competitive advantages, synergistic value creation, and a trusting reputation 
(Crane et al., 2008). 
The preceding benefits are complimentary to the goals mentioned earlier of building 
brand equity, establishing trust, and improving leadership’s effectiveness. In this study, 
sustainability is reviewed as a continuous process of analyzing performance outcomes (financial 
and nonfinancial) over time (Elkington, 1997; Gao, 2008; Müller & Pfleger, 2014; Wu et al., 
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2013). WCED initiated the foundations of a continuous process in 1987 to ensure that future 
generations are not adversely affected or killed by the actions of forefathers.  
Understanding stakeholder needs is a key element in building long-term relationships. 
Stakeholders are customers, shareholders, suppliers, employees, and the community surrounding 
a corporation. Freeman and Dmytriyev (2017) stated that stakeholder interests must be 
incorporated into the valuation, and trade-offs between stakeholders must be avoided (p. 4). 
Table 3 lists seven principles of stakeholder interests by the Clarkston Center for Business Ethics 
(1999). The seven principles are applied within the CSR initiative to identify business activities 
that align with society’s expectations. CEOs must position themselves and the corporation for 
regular communication with stakeholders to understand needs and expectations.  
Table 3. Principles of Stakeholder Management  
Number Description 
Principle 1 Managers should acknowledge and actively monitor the concerns of all legitimate stakeholders 
and take their interests into account in decisions and operations. 
Principle 2 Managers should listen to and openly communicate with stakeholders about their respective 
concerns and contributions and about the risks they assume because of their involvement with the 
corporation. 
Principle 3 Managers should adopt processes and modes of behavior that are sensitive to the concerns and 
capabilities of each stakeholder constituency. 
Principle 4 Managers should recognize the interdependence of efforts and rewards among stakeholders and 
should attempt to fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of corporate activity among them, 
accounting for their respective risks and vulnerabilities. 
Principle 5 Managers should cooperate with other entities, public and private, to ensure that the risks and 
harms of corporate activities are minimized and, where unavoidable, appropriately compensated 
for. 
Principle 6 Managers should avoid activities that might jeopardize inalienable human rights (e.g., the right to 
life) or incur risks that, if clearly understood, would be patently unacceptable to relevant 
stakeholders. 
Principle 7 Managers should acknowledge the potential conflicts between (a) their own role as corporate 
stakeholders and (b) their legal and moral responsibilities for stakeholder interests, and managers 
should address conflicts through open communication, appropriate reporting, incentive systems, 
and, where necessary, third-party review. 
Note. Adapted from Principles of Stakeholder Management: The Clarkson Principles, by Clarkson Centre for 
Business Ethics, Toronto, Canada, Unknown, p. 4. Copyright 1999 by University of Toronto. Adapted with permission. 
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Szwajkowski (2000) states that the flow of information between the corporation and 
stakeholders is crucial, as “honest disclosure breeds control of information, control of behavior 
empowerment on stakeholder issues, and perhaps most important, trust” (p. 389). Forbes author 
Dina Medland (2015) suggests implementing private industry tools to identify social issues 
relevant to stakeholders and creating a matrix-based network for priorities. Corporations must 
establish trust within their community of operations to achieve long-term business sustainability 
(Idowu & Louche, 2011).  
Once trust is established and CEOs understand stakeholder needs and societal 
expectations, the next step is identifying strategic business activities to support stakeholder 
valuation for overall corporate sustainability. Corporate leaders created strategic business 
activities to produce performance outcomes to be measured over time. The four constructs of 
stakeholder valuation for overall corporate sustainability are financial performance, 
environmental performance, social performance, and governance performance (RobecoSAM, 
2016).  
To eliminate overlap of environmental and social performance outcomes within the TBL 
and CSR theories, the four constructs of stakeholder valuation are split into two categories for 
further literary review: investor value (financial and governance) and community welfare 
(environmental and social). Figure 2 illustrates how the four constructs represent community 
welfare and investor value within stakeholder valuation. Each construct will be reviewed in the 
context of investor value creation or community welfare, as previously indicated for a holistic 
view of stakeholder valuation and corporate sustainability. Examples of the key performance 
indicators (KPIs) are listed by construct in Appendix B.  
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Figure 2. Stakeholder value, investor value, and community-welfare interest. CSRO = 
overall corporate social responsibility. 
 
Corporate governance performance (CGP) is an investor value-driven performance 
indicator that the International Federation of Accountants Committee (2003) defined as “the set 
of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with the goal 
of providing strategic direction, ensuring objectives are achieved, ascertaining risks are managed 
appropriately and verifying the organization’s resources are used responsibly” (p. 6). Corporate 
leaders and various other gatekeepers are responsible for corporations’ financial stability, trust, 
and investor confidence (Brockett & Rezaee, 2012). The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the 
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 are regulatory policies that were put in place to increase gatekeepers’ 
accountability to both investors and the public. Each was created following a financial scandal in 
which unethical practices resulted in a widespread crisis.  
CGP includes business ethics as a mandate of organizational accountability for moral 
principles, standard business practices, and internal controls. Governance also provides 
transparency through monitoring and incentives aligning with investor interests (Henriques & 
Richardson, 2004). CGP relies upon CEOs’ leadership and their ability to create an 
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organizational culture of integrity. Ethics, integrity, and transparency build trust and increase 
brand equity, important features for creating value for investors. Businesses fail to exist when 
CEOs and others within the company fail to make thoughtful, intelligent, wise, and ethical 
decisions (Carroll et al., 2012). KPIs assigned to governance provide internal and external 
controls to maintain organizational integrity (Table B1). 
Corporate environmental performance (CEP) is a community welfare-driven 
performance indicator that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2011) defined as “the 
measurable results of the environmental management system, related to an organization's control 
of its environmental aspects, based on its environmental policy, objectives, and targets” (p. 1). 
Environmental change is a shared problem, and the corporations that control the surrounding 
environment are responsible for protecting future generations. Such actions are considered 
external business operations, so they are included in public-image and brand-protection 
initiatives. Brockett and Rezaee (2012) stated that society has greatly benefited from corporate 
environmental policies since the early 2000s.  
As natural and business disasters occur, corporations take steps to prevent reoccurrence 
or to mitigate further damage. Prevention led to the development of environmental programs 
with KPIs (Table B2) designed to preserve natural resources (Duckworth & Moore, 2010) and 
minimize harm (Henriques & Richardson, 2004). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
has special programs for corporations that take early action on various environmental issues. 
Corporations that participate in environmental programs receive public recognition and take 
proactive positions for preventing environmental harm and problem-solving. Participation adds 
value to community welfare by increasing brand equity, building trust, and raising awareness. 
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Corporate social performance (CSP) is a community welfare–driven performance 
indicator that is defined as fulfilling a corporation’s mission by aligning business activities with 
society’s interests and by accepting accountability based on societal values (Brockett & Rezaee, 
2012). In other words, CSP means finding goals that share the needs of the community while 
conducting business with integrity, even when the corporation is not at fault for causing an event 
that produces a need (e.g. natural disaster). To understand the community’s needs and reduce 
reputational risks, the corporation must engage and interact with the community (Herriott, 2016; 
Medland, 2015).  
KPIs assigned to CSP address internal and external business operations to protect basic 
human rights (Table B3). Participation in global social concerns depends upon the overall CSR 
set by each corporate leadership. Like CEP, participation in social concerns adds value to 
community welfare by increasing brand equity and building trust while taking a proactive 
position for prevention and problem solving. 
Corporate financial performance (CFP) is an investor value-driven performance 
indicator that Karlson (2016) defined as a “measurable value that indicates how well a company 
is doing regarding generating revenue and profits” (p. 1). As with CGP, corporations must 
establish trust and financial stability through external compliance with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 to attract capital investors. Karlson (2016) identified 
29 traditional financial KPIs that determine financial stability (Table B4). Financial reliability is 
essential for investor confidence and efficient capital markets (Brockett & Rezaee, 2012). To 
improve transparency and gatekeeper accountability, internal controls such as executive 
certifications and audit oversight committees can be implemented (p. 95).  
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In preparation for applying the upper echelons theory and the social-role theory, the 
holistic concentric circles model will demonstrate how financial, environmental, social, and 
governance constructs work together to provide a holistic analysis of year-over-year corporate 
sustainability performance. 
 Holistic Concentric Circles Model 
The current study’s third goal is introducing a paradigm shift in defining and analyzing 
corporate sustainability constructs to create a holistic view that considers financial and 
nonfinancial performance equally. As mentioned previously, a sustainability analysis typically 
does not include financial performance. The shift evolves from concentric circles (WCED, 1971) 
and hierarchal pyramids (Carroll, 1991) to create a holistic view illustrating the shared value and 
the equal consideration of all four constructs: financial performance, environmental performance, 
social performance, and governance performance (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The evolution of the concentric circles model.  
WCED = World Commission on Environment and Development; CGP = corporate governance 
performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CSP = corporate social performance; 
CFP = corporate financial performance. 
WCED Notion Pyramid Model
(Crane, McWilliams et al. 2008) (Carroll, 1991)
Proactive Action Proactive Action
Social Value Awareness Social Value Awareness
Economic Growth Economic Growth
Holistic Concentric
Circles Model
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The evolution of the concentric circles model begins with WCED’s 1971 introduction of 
the concentric circles notion of social responsibility (Crane et al., 2008), in which corporations, 
to meet societal needs, must induce satisfaction with the quality of services rendered. The three 
circles (economic growth, social value awareness, and proactive action) represent the first set of 
performance outcomes (constructs) related to CSR and sustainability.  
Geva (2008) defined the concentric circles model as a shared environment where a 
business’s and a society’s responsibilities are integrated and aligned with common a goal. In the 
format, the performance outcomes (constructs) do not reflect dependency or hierarchy, which 
encourages an inclusive and holistic view of sustainability. Each construct is placed on a shared 
circle, with the innermost layer representing the core foundational principle of the corporation 
(profitability) and the outermost layer representing shared values (societal norms).  
In the pyramid model, founding sustainability theorist Archie B. Carroll (1991) 
expounded upon the WCED’s notion and grouped business responsibilities into a hierarchal 
structure. Carroll removed the integration of constructs to provide a rigid, procedure-based 
approach with high-priority responsibilities at the base. Like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs for the 
human condition, the upper levels of the pyramid are not addressed until the lower levels are 
completely satisfied. Carroll added philanthropy as a discretionary category because this factor 
was gaining momentum in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Geva, 2008). Although helping others 
adds value to businesses, participation was voluntary and not considered a high priority.  
The holistic concentric circles model takes the four constructs of sustainability and 
applies the WCED’s all-inclusive integration. Each point of the diamond within the circle 
represents a performance outcome, including CFP, CEP, CSP, and CGP. The all-inclusive 
integration brings a holistic view to sustainability; a CSR initiative may concurrently satisfy 
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multiple constructs in any combination. Corporate leaders are liberated to address stakeholder 
value, investor value, and community welfare interests to pursue a holistic vision of 
sustainability performance. 
 Upper Echelons Theory 
In the upper echelons theory, Donald C. Hambrick and Phillis A. Mason (1984) stated 
that corporate performance reflects the executive leaders’ personal perceptions. Although 
researchers grounded early empirical studies in behavior-based theories, this theory evolved to 
embrace demographic and heterogeneous influences on corporate strategy and performance 
(Nielsen, 2009). Personal perceptions are built from the characteristics created by demographic 
and heterogeneous influences in a given period of time. 
CEOs and executive leaders make decisions based on personal and professional 
experiences (demographic characteristics), impacting value creation (stakeholder and investor), 
community welfare, and the actions that produce corporate performance outcomes (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Nielsen, 2009). Gender is a demographic characteristic 
drawing much interest in the production of corporate performance outcomes included in 
sustainability (Feng et al., 2017; Ho et al., 2014; Khan & Vieito, 2013).  
Post and Byron (2015) illustrated a direct relationship between gender-related 
professional experiences and corporate performance outcomes. The results suggest that female 
executives had a positive effect on corporate financial performance and overall strategy for the 
period. Jeong and Harrison (2017) results indicated that female executives have negative short-
term market returns but positive long-term effects on corporate performance. The empirical 
evidence supports the idea that female leadership improves corporate performance (Moreno-
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Gómez et al., 2018). Although I did not test individual experiences in this study, the empirical 
evidence should consistently reveal gender differences in the sustainability results. 
 Social Role Theory 
Social role theory began in 1984 as an explanation for gender-role stereotypes (Koenig & 
Eagly, 2014). Societal beliefs defined the acceptable roles of women and men, and they assigned 
value through the characteristics of the accepted role. In Koenig and Eagly (2014) sample, 
women who cared for children were nurturing, warm, and sensitive; these valued characteristics 
have become a standard for women in society. As an observer’s established standard, similar 
feminine characteristics are applied to every female person (Kiser, 2015), and this behavior is 
expected to be consistent in all situations (Eagly, 1987), including in corporate leadership. 
Individual demographic and heterogeneous influences learned from childhood and work 
experience shape the valuation of gender characteristics (Gilligan, 1982; Jeong & Harrison, 
2017). Corporate leaders use personal perceptions developed through experiences to make 
decisions, develop business strategies, and prioritize ethical considerations. At times, corporate 
leaders’ behavior may conflict with gender stereotypes to do what is best for the organization 
(Boulouta, 2012). Women in leadership roles may have to abandon nurturing, caring, and 
sensitive characteristics and replace these feminine characteristics with masculine ones.  
Gender bias occurs when leaders’ actions are inconsistent with an evaluator’s belief of 
appropriate behavior for the gender (Weyer, 2007). In general, “agentic traits are ascribed to men 
and communal behaviors are ascribed to women” (p. 485). As mentioned previously, a woman 
abandoning sensitive characteristics would be scorned as unacceptable and unworthy of the 
leadership position. In similar situations, men who demonstrate male gender stereotypes are 
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more acceptable in leadership roles (Lamsa, Sakkinen, & Turjanmaa, 2000; Ryan & Haslam, 
2007; Schein, Muller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996). 
Forsyth, Heiney, and Wright (1997) argued that the social role theory contains bias 
against women to limit promotions. Post, DiTomaso, Lowe, Farris, and Cordero (2009) refuted 
this argument, indicating that women are as promotable as their male counterparts for leadership 
positions. Researchers have also shown that female gender stereotypes positively impact board 
performance (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Nielsen & Huse, 2010), CSR (Burges & 
Tharenou, 2002; Huse et al., 2009; Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994), and stakeholder needs (Bear, 
Rahman, & Post, 2010).  
Overall studies have shown that communal female characteristics such as nurturing, 
caring, and sensitivity positively influence actions that promote successful CSR and corporate 
sustainability initiatives. In recent studies, scholars such as Boulouta (2012) and Velte (2016) 
found a positive relationship between a female presence in corporate leadership and 
sustainability performance. Kim and Starks (2016) provided additional support by indicating that 
female corporate leaders are more likely to diversify board membership and contribute unique 
skills proven to increase the firm’s value.  
Although I did not test societal beliefs or individual perceptions in this study, the 
empirical evidence should consistently reveal gender differences in the sustainability results. 
Regardless of gender, corporate leadership behaviors must create value and lead to positive 
sustainability outcomes if they are to establish trust, build brand equity, and improve leadership 
effectiveness. In the next section, I cite literature to show that overall firm performance increases 
as sustainability performance increases. 
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 Corporate Sustainability and Firm Performance 
According to the Audit Committee Institute, over 50% of corporate leaders in large 
companies believe focusing on sustainability provides a competitive advantage in corporate 
performance (KPMG, 2018). Feng et al. (2017) supported KPMG (2018) by identifying 
significant positive correlations between CSR activities and the firm’s financial performance 
across multiple industries. Feng et al. were the first scholars to provide empirical evidence of the 
homogenous application of CSR’s impact on firm performance.  
In the early years of CSR research, McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright (2006) conducted a 
comprehensive analysis on available CSR strategies and the theoretical implications on firm 
financial performance. In summary, the available CSR strategies are highly effective for 
improving firm financial performance. A wide range of studies spanning 12 years echo this 
favorable consideration with supporting empirical evidence (Feng et al., 2017; Mackey, 2005; 
Whalen, 2013). 
The results of a Harvard University study reveal that “finally, we provide evidence that 
High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, in 
terms of stock market as well as accounting performance” (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). 
High-sustainability companies are those that adopted sustainability policies before the 
international movement of the late 1900s (p. 1). Although KPMG (2018) noted that less than 
47% of small business owners do not believe that sustainability improves corporate performance, 
Srichatsuwan (2014) provided evidence of strong correlations between CSR strategies and firm 
performance in small businesses.  
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 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
I used a quantitative analysis to determine the relationships between corporate leadership 
gender and year-over-year sustainability performance outcomes for 2014 to 2017. The q ratio 
and z score can also be combined to measure firm performance. I selected a sample of 99 
multinational and large corporations from the S&P 500 Dow Jones Sustainability North 
American Composite Index. I retrieved the data for the selected sample from Bloomberg, which 
is an approved source of RobecoSAM and a mutual third-party reporting partner of both Dow 
Jones and Sustainalytics.  
 Data and Sample Selection 
The population of data to measure today’s sustainability (ESG) performance without 
financial performance begins with the annual CSA results collected by the private investment 
firm RobecoSAM (2016). The CSA is a trusted industry tool used to collect data from over 3,400 
multinational and large publicly traded companies. RobecoSAM uses the CSA to assign a score 
to each performance metric and releases the information to approve research and analysis 
sources.  
The assessment contains up to 120 questions that capture general and industry level 
information measured on a 100-point proprietary weighted scale. RobecoSAM assigned scores 
for CEP, CSP, and CGP; then, RobecoSAM computed a total for each participating organization. 
The overall total scores are ranked on a scale of 1 to 100 by the industry (CSRO) and released to 
approved sources. 
 One approved source is S&P Dow Jones Indices, a joint venture corporation providing 
global financial market indices to industry professionals (2018). The Dow Jones runs a 
proprietary rule-based ranking algorithm for CSA sustainability scores to calculate the “top 10% 
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most sustainable market caps per industry” (RobecoSAM, 2016). Dow Jones scores publishes its 
scores through Bloomberg (2018), a privately held financial, software, data, and media company 
that is headquartered in New York City. 
A second approved source, Sustainalytics, is a privately held financial services company 
headquartered in Amsterdam (2018). As a trusted partner of Dow Jones since 2000 and of 
Bloomberg since 2014, Sustainalytics continues to be a reputable resource for analyzing and 
publishing sustainability scores. Sustainalytics creates its scores by running a proprietary asset 
weighted-based ranking algorithm with 70 factors, including level of importance and industry 
peers (Hale, 2016). I selected a sample of 99 CSA participants from the S&P 500 Dow Jones 
Sustainability North American Composite Index, for which the sustainability scores are reported 
consecutively for each year from 2014 to 2017.  
I retrieved ESG performance, overall sustainability ranking (CSRO), general firm 
information, and financial data from an authorized Bloomberg terminal using the appropriate 
credentials. For Dow Jones, the ESG and CSRO data are only available for 2017. For 
Sustainalytics, the data are available for the full testing period, from 2014 to 2017. Following 
Post and Byron (2015), I selected these financial metrics referred to as CFP: return on equity 
(ROE), return on investment capital (ROIC), return on assets (ROA), and profit. I then used q 
ratio (overall investment value) and z score (overall investment risk) to add value to the holistic 
perception of corporation health (Elsaid, 2014). I calculated the Tobin’s q values manually 
according to the method that Smith and Watts (1992) established. 
 Data Coding and Analysis 
Consistent with previous studies on leadership gender, I coded female CEOs as 1 and 
male CEOs as 0 (Jeong & Harrison, 2017). Female CEOs comprise 5% of the total North 
 39 
American sample (five women to 94 men). Figure 4 illustrates the corporation and gender counts 
by industry. The low percentage of female CEO representation is consistent with the dominance 
of male leaders in the global business market (Adler, 1997; Chen, 2001; Hoffman, 2013; Javidan 
et al., 2016; Marshall & Hopfl, 2007). Graphically, the distribution curve of the CEO gender 
count by industry and the corporation count by industry are similar. I coded the GICS industry 
categories numerically from 1 to 11 (in alphabetical order), as shown in Table 4 (Fidelity, 2018). 
 
Figure 4. Corporations and CEO gender, by industry. Panel a) is the number of 
corporations in each industry; b) is the number of women and men in each industry. 
 
Corporation presence is strong in all industries except telecommunication services. 
Reasoning for the underrepresentation of communication is not addressed. The top three 
industries with the most corporations are information technology (N = 16), financials (N = 15) 
and industrials (N = 14). Energy and utilities have the same count (N = 7), as do consumer 
staples and materials (N = 6). Arguably, it could be inferred that the number of companies for the 
latter four industries are closely related due to a shared consumer base. Further testing is required 
to confirm; however, this relationship is beyond the scope of this study. 
  
a
) 
b
) 
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Table 4. Coding for GICS Industries 
Category Code Description 
1 
Consumer discretionary Manufacture goods or provide services that people want but don't 
necessarily need, such as high-definition televisions, new cars, 
and family vacations. 
2 
Consumer staples Provide goods and services that people use daily, like food, 
clothing, or other personal products. 
3 
Energy Exploration, production, or management of energy resources 
such as oil and gas, and the companies that service these 
industries. 
4 
Financials Engaged in businesses such as banking and brokerage, mortgage 
finance, and insurance. 
5 
Health care Engaged in the production and delivery of medicine and health 
care–related goods and services. 
6 
Industrials Manufacture and distribute capital goods to support industries 
such as aerospace and defense, construction and engineering, 
electrical equipment, and heavy machinery. 
7 
Information technology Offer goods and services, including hardware, software, 
semiconductors, and consulting services. 
8 
Materials Manufacture or process chemicals and plastics, or they may 
harvest forests or extract metals and minerals. 
9 
Real estate Own commercial real estate properties and may be structured as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). 
10 
Telecommunication services Facilitate communication or provide entertainment content and 
other information through various types of media. 
11 
Utilities Engage in the production and delivery of electric power, natural 
gas, water, and other utility services, such as steam and cooled 
air. 
Note. Adapted from “Compare Sector Characteristics,” by Fidelity, https://www.fidelity.com/sector-
investing/compare-sectors. Copyright 1998-2019 by FMR LLC. Adapted with permission. 
 
I grouped the percentages of women and men in C-suites and boards of directors into four 
categories in descending order: greater than 75%, 51% to 75%, 26 to 50%, and 25% or less. I 
conducted the recoding based on the percentages that I retrieved from Bloomberg for female and 
male C-suite members and directors. These categories provide four groups to test for significant 
year-over-year differences by gender. Figure 5 illustrates the total number of filled positions in 
C-suites and boards of directors by gender, followed by the percentage representation in that 
category. For example, in 2014, there were 1,131 directors and 22,566 C-suite executives. The 
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results show that women represented no more than 50% of any group; the gender gap is 
consistent for all 4 years.  
 
Figure 5. Coding for female representation in C-suites and boards of directors.  
Panel a) is the total count for board of directors by gender in each year; b) is the total count for 
C-suite members by gender in each year; c) is the total count of women directors by category 
(greater than 75%, 51% to 75%, 26 to 50%, and 25% or less); d) is the total count of women C-
suite members by category; e) is the total count of men directors by category; f) is the total count 
of men C-suite members by category. 
 
I grouped the representation of female C-suite members and directors who had a female 
CEO and those who did not into eight categories, which are presented in Table 5. These eight 
groups allow for testing based on combinations of female presence in leadership roles. The 33% 
threshold is the median representation for the results previously discussed in Figure 5. The first 
four categories identify corporations whose female C-suite and director representation are above 
a
) 
b
) 
c
) 
d
) 
e
) 
f
) 
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and below the threshold. Categories 5–8 repeat Categories 1–4, except with a female CEO as 
well. 
Table 5. Coding for Female Representation in C-Suites and Boards of Directors 
Category Description 
1 Greater than 33% female directors AND greater than 33% female C-suite members 
2 Greater than 33% female directors AND no more than 33% female C-suite members 
3 No more than 33% female directors AND greater than 33% female C-suite members 
4 No more than 33% female directors AND at most 33% female C-suite members 
5 Same as Category 1, except with a female CEO 
6 Same as Category 2, except with a female CEO 
7 Same as Category 3, except with a female CEO 
8 Same as Category 4, except with a female CEO 
 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this coding, the 2017 values were grouped into the 
categories and displayed by industry in Figure 6. The results indicate that 61% of corporations 
have a Category 4 representation of less than 33% female representation on C-suites and boards 
of directors with a male CEO. Health care, information technology, and industrials are the largest 
industries within Category 4 in 2017. If the empirical evidence of the social role theory and the 
upper echelons theory are sound, the study results will reflect an increase in sustainability scores 
as the number of female representation increases in CEO, C-suite, and board of directors 
positions. 
 43 
 
 
Figure 6. Combination female representation, 2017.  
Panel a) is the total female representation of C-suite members and directors by category as 
defined in Table 5. Three categories (6,7, & 8) make up the 4% labeled as “other”. Panel b) is the 
same total from panel a) grouped by industry.  
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I split the single available dataset into two datasets (A and B) that contained the same 
general firm information and financial data. For Dataset A, I added the 2017 ESG performance 
and the CSRO data for both Dow Jones and Sustainalytics. In this dataset analysis, I compared 
the 2017 data for Dow Jones and Sustainalytics and evaluated leadership gender’s impact on 
sustainability performance. Although the Dow Jones and the Sustainalytics data have the same 
population, these firms’ methodologies for determining sustainability are different. My goal here 
is to create an empirical knowledge base that does not currently exist.  
For Dataset B, I added the Sustainalytics data for ESG performance from 2014 to 2017 
and for CSRO. I analyzed this dataset according to the original scope of the year-over-year 
analysis. I performed the initial tests to determine the appropriate statistical techniques and 
analytical approaches. I applied a normality test to both datasets, and the results for each indicate 
multiple deviations within the Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic results. I present these deviations, 
along with illustrations for each dataset, in Chapter 4. 
I also applied the test of multivariate normality to both datasets, and each had a 
Mahalanobis distance greater than the critical value assigned for the number of dependent 
variables at 0.001 degrees of freedom. Mahalanobis distance results will also be discussed in 
Chapter 4 for each dataset. The greater value indicates that there are substantial outliers that 
cannot be removed for these datasets.  
Typically, financial information is not included when analyzing ESG performance 
results, as this may influence the Mahalanobis distance. For comparison, I calculated the 
multivariate normality a second time for each dataset and excluded the CFP variables, resulting 
in a Mahalanobis distance that is less than the critical value. I discuss these results further in 
Chapter 4. This change in Mahalanobis confirms that the CFP variables are substantial outliers 
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and that the 2017 ESG performance and 2017 CSRO scores for the Dow Jones and Sustainalytics 
data are similar enough to exclude the Dow Jones data from the 2014–2017 analysis.  
I performed a comparative analysis of the 2017 Dow Jones and Sustainalytics data 
(Dataset A). The comparative analysis of the 2017 data contains descriptive statistics and ESG 
performance averages by industry and by CEO gender. As this is a high-level comparison of 
ESG performance variables for a single period, I excluded the financial data and did not explore 
the relationships among the variables. I also conducted a year-over-year analysis of the 2014 to 
2017 Sustainalytics data (Dataset B), beginning with normality tests. 
The normality tests’ results determined the nonparametric method as the appropriate 
analytical approach for the 2014 to 2017 Sustainalytics year-over-year analysis. I used the 
Friedman test to determine the significance of the changes for all the dependent variables from 
2014 to 2017. I then used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine the effect sizes of the 
significant changes and the Mann–Whitney U used to determine whether the significant changes 
are across independent groups (e.g., CEO gender). I provide these results, along with the means 
and medians to determine more impact (H2). 
I used the Kruskal–Wallis test to determine differences across the C-suite and board of 
director groups (H4 and H6, respectively). Correlations, descriptive statistics, and other 
illustrative graphs provide evidence for the remaining hypotheses (H1, H3, H5, and H7). In the 
next chapter, I provide a detailed analysis of the results for each dataset. 
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 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 Dataset A 
Dataset A contains the 2017 values for ESG performance and CSRO for Dow Jones and 
Sustainalytics, as well as general firm information and CFP data. The ESG performance, CSRO, 
and CFP variables used for analysis are listed in Table 6. I calculated the descriptive statistics for 
the comparative analysis of nonfinancial constructs by industry in order to determine the 
normality of the data. ESG performance and CSRO by industry are constant for the 
communication services industry, resulting in exclusion from the output. 
Table 6. Dependent Variables for Analysis, 2017 
Dow Jones 
Code Name Construct Measurement 
CGP Governance (percentile) Governance Ordinal 
CEP Environment (percentile) Environmental Ordinal 
CSP Social (percentile) Social Ordinal 
CSRO ESG (ranking) Overall ESG Ordinal 
Sustainalytics 
Code Name Construct Measurement 
CGP Governance (percentile) Governance Ordinal 
CEP Environment (percentile) Environmental Ordinal 
CSP Social (percentile) Social Ordinal 
CSRO ESG (ranking) Overall ESG Ordinal 
CFP 
Code Name Construct Measurement 
ROE Return on equity Financial Ordinal 
ROIC Return on investment capital Financial Ordinal 
ROA Return on assets Financial Ordinal 
Profit Profit Financial Ordinal 
Note. CGP = corporate governance performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CSP = corporate 
social performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; ESG = environmental, social, and governance 
criteria; CFP = corporate financial performance. 
 
If the output of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov normality test, which determines goodness of 
fit, has p < .05, then an abnormal distribution is present (Pallant, 2016). The negative skewness 
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suggests that clustering is “high and to the right” with extremes, causing a relatively flat 
distribution (p. 57). The results in Table 7 show that CEP, CSP, and CGP performance are 
abnormal for both Dow Jones and Sustainalytics across seven industries. The Sustainalytics data 
show abnormal distributions for all three ESG variables, whereas the Dow Jones data show an 
abnormal distribution only for CSRO. The ESG performance percentiles contribute to CSRO, so 
the overall results for Dow Jones and Sustainalytics are similar. 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Industries with Abnormal Distributions, 2017 
Performance GICS industry n M Median SD Min. Max. Skewness Kol.–Smirnov (p) 
Sustainalytics          
CEP Industrials 14 62.25 69.18 62.25 20.39 22.20 –1.015 .011 
 Information technology 15 84.23 86.08 84.23 14.38 40.50 –2.114 .027 
 Materials 5 63.51 75.00 63.51 33.73 5.30 –1.843 .035 
CSP Consumer discretionary 11 83.62 88.73 83.62 12.72 53.80 –1.723 .004 
 Industrials 14 69.60 81.71 69.60 22.65 21.90 –0.772 .017 
CGP Industrials 14 73.91 85.13 73.91 22.81 12.70 –1.808 .014 
Dow Jones          
CSRO Consumer staples 6 83.17 85.00 83.17 11.05 62.00 –1.798 .043 
 Industrials 14 82.14 84.00 82.14 13.10 55.00 –0.979 .028 
CEP Energy 7 76.71 83.00 76.71 16.02 50.00 –1.139 .012 
CSP Materials 6 90.33 96.00 90.33 12.16 72.00 –0.979 .024 
CGP Utilities 7 75.29 73.00 75.29 9.52 67.00 2.199 .005 
Note. GICS = Global Industry Classification Standard; Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum; 
Kol. = Kolmogorov; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CSP = corporate social performance; 
CGP = corporate governance performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall. 
 
The Sustainalytics results show that the information technology and consumer 
discretionary categories have abnormal distributions, whereas the Dow Jones results show that 
the consumer-staples, energy, and utilities categories have abnormal distributions. The materials 
category also has an abnormal distribution in both the Sustainalytics CEP and Dow Jones CSP 
results. Differences in proprietary methodologies for calculating ESG performance drive these 
very different results by industry. Understanding the impact of these differences in sustainability 
measurement could be a fruitful area of research. 
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After completing the normality test and determining the abnormal distributions, I 
conducted the multivariate normality test twice to determine possible outliers. The first test 
included all 12 dependent variables listed in Table 6, resulting in a Mahalanobis distance range 
of 4.291 to 70.429. I compared the maximum value with the critical value on the chi-squared 
distribution chart (Table 8) based on the number of dependent variables as well as on the degrees 
of freedom (MedCalc_Software_bvba, 2019). For the defined parameters (12 degrees of 
freedom, p = .001), χ2 = 32.9090. The maximum Mahalanobis distance (70.429) is greater than 
the critical value (32.9090), which indicates that the group has substantial multivariate outliers. 
Table 8. Chi-Squared Distribution Chart 
  p               
df .100 .050 .025 .020 .010 .005 .002 .001 
1 2.706 3.841 5.024 5.412 6.635 7.879 9.550 10.828 
2 4.605 5.991 7.378 7.824 9.210 10.597 12.429 13.816 
3 6.251 7.815 9.348 9.837 11.345 12.838 14.796 16.266 
4 7.779 9.488 11.143 11.668 13.277 14.860 16.924 18.467 
5 9.236 11.070 12.833 13.388 15.086 16.750 18.907 20.515 
6 10.645 12.592 14.449 15.033 16.812 18.548 20.791 22.458 
7 12.017 14.067 16.013 16.622 18.475 20.278 22.601 24.322 
8 13.362 15.507 17.535 18.168 20.090 21.955 24.352 26.124 
9 14.684 16.919 19.023 19.679 21.666 23.589 26.056 27.877 
10 15.987 18.307 20.483 21.161 23.209 25.188 27.722 29.588 
11 17.275 19.675 21.920 22.618 24.725 26.757 29.354 31.264 
12 18.549 21.026 23.337 24.054 26.217 28.300 30.957 32.909 
13 19.812 22.362 24.736 25.472 27.688 29.819 32.535 34.528 
14 21.064 23.685 26.119 26.873 29.141 31.319 34.091 36.123 
Note. Adapted from “Values of the chi-squared distribution,” by MedCalc, https://www.medcalc.org/manual/chi-
square-table.php. Copyright 2019 by MedCalc Software bvba. Adapted with permission. 
 
For the second test, I removed the CFP variables and included only ESG performance 
and CSRO. As stated previously, sustainability typically does not include financial data. I 
hypothesized that the removal of the CFP variables would eliminate indicators of outliers. 
Removing the four CFP variables resulted in a Mahalanobis distance range of 1.485 to 25.963. 
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For the defined parameters (eight degrees of freedom, p = .001), χ2 = 26.1240. The maximum 
Mahalanobis distance (25.963) is less than the critical value (26.1240), which indicates that there 
are no substantial multivariate outliers for the group. These results show that the CFP variables 
are the outlier variables causing the abnormal distribution for the entire group. 
These results also suggest that the Dow Jones and Sustainalytics ESG performance and 
CSRO data are similar despite methodology and Kolmogorov–Smirnov value differences. For 
the purpose of further confirming the results of the Mahalanobis distance, I calculated averages 
for ESG performance and CSRO data. Figures 7 and 8 graphically illustrate the similarities 
between Dow Jones and Sustainalytics for ESG performance and CSRO for 2017. Figure 7 
shows the averages for Dow Jones and Sustainalytics by industry. Although the Dow Jones 
averages are slightly higher, the flow and distribution of values across industries are similar.  
 
Figure 7. Average environmental, social, and governmental (ESG) performance and overall 
corporate social responsibility (CSRO) by industry, 2017  
CGP = corporate governmental performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; 
CSP = corporate social performance. Panel a) are the averages for the Dow Jones reporting entity 
and b) are the averages for Sustainalytics. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates average ESG performance and CSRO for CEO gender by industry. 
Female CEO presence is limited to four industries, approximately 30% of the total market. For 
the purpose of ascertaining differences in gender influence on ESG performance and CSRO, I 
created comparison graphs for the shared industries: consumer staples, industrials, information 
a
) 
b
) 
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technology, and utilities. The results reveal in several graphs across various industries for Dow 
Jones and Sustainalytics that female CEOs produce a higher average than male CEOs do. 
Consumer staples shows higher values of CSRO, CEP, and CSP scores. Industrials is higher 
within CSRO, CGP, and CEP. Information technology is higher within CEP, and utilities is 
higher within CGP and CSP.  
 
Figure 8. Average overall, governance, environmental, and social performance by CEO 
gender and industry, 2017.  
DJ = Dow Jones; SS = Sustainalytics; CGP = corporate governance performance; CEP = corporate 
environmental performance; CSP = corporate social performance; CSRO = corporate social 
responsibility–overall. Panel a) are the CSRO averages and panels b) through d) are the ESG averages. 
 
 
 
a
) 
b
) 
c
) 
d
) 
 51 
 Dataset B 
Dataset B contains 2014 to 2017 values for ESG performance and CSRO for 
Sustainalytics, along with general firm information and CFP data. The values for Dow Jones 
were not available for 2014 to 2016 via the Bloomberg terminal and have been excluded from 
this portion of the study. The ESG performance, CSRO, and CFP variables used for analysis are 
listed in Table 9 along with investment value and investment risk. A deeper review of the dataset 
reveals interesting trends in the activity. Although the representation of women in C-suite and 
director positions is 25% or less, the number of women incrementally increased (Figure 9).  
The number of women in C-suite positions across all industries increased by 22% from 
2015 (n = 1,318) to 2017 (n = 1,688) but has remained stagnant since. For the real estate 
industry, the number of female directors remained constant (n = 8) for the entire reporting 
period. Telecommunication services also showed little to no increase in female representation for 
C-suite (n = 12) and director (n = 3) positions during the reporting period. According to the 
graphical trends presented in Appendix C, the ESG performance and CSRO scores rarely 
fluctuated year over year. The CFP and firm performance averages fluctuated more frequently 
and had larger intervals. 
Appendix C shows the telecommunication, information technology, and consumer 
discretionary industries maintained the highest averaging scores for ESG performance and 
CSRO during the reporting period. The average CSRO scores (on a 100-point scale) were 90.6 
for telecommunications, 83.5 for information technology, and 80.8 for consumer discretionary. 
ESG performance percentiles are contributors to CSRO, therefore demonstrating similar results. 
The industrials, consumer staples, and consumer discretionary industries maintained the highest 
averages for ROE, ROIC, and ROA. 
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Table 9. Dependent Variables for Analysis, 2014–2017 
Sustainalytics 
Code Name Construct Measurement 
CGP Governance (percentile) Governance Ordinal 
CEP Environment (percentile) Environmental Ordinal 
CSP Social (percentile) Social Ordinal 
CSRO ESG (ranking) Overall ESG Ordinal 
CFP 
Code Name Construct Measurement 
ROE Return on equity Financial Ordinal 
ROIC Return on investment capital Financial Ordinal 
ROA Return on assets Financial Ordinal 
Profit Profit Financial Ordinal 
Overall firm performance 
Code Name Construct Measurement 
q ratio Investment value Firm performance Ordinal 
z score Investment risk Firm performance Ordinal 
Note. CGP = corporate governance performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; 
CSP = corporate social performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; 
ESG = environmental, social, and governance criteria. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Female C-suite and board of director membership by industry, 2014 through 
2017. 
Panel a) are the number of women C-suite members in each year; b) are the number of women 
directors in each year. 
 
 
 
 
a
) 
b
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Appendix C also shows the real estate and financial categories had high profit averages 
exceeding 60%. The consumer staples category had the highest q ratio (15%) and had a 
competitive z score (22%), with the second-highest value behind information technology (27%). 
I calculated the descriptive statistics for ESG, CSRO, and CFP by industry so as to determine 
normality. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov values below the significance threshold (p < .05) in Table 
10 indicate the abnormal distributions for all performance variables, years, and industries.  
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for the Abnormal Distributions, 2014–2017 
2014 
Performance GICS industry n M Median SD Min. Max. Skewness 
Kol.–
Smirnov 
(p) 
CEP Financials 15 78.43 83.08 17.40 33.70 96.90 –1.432 .033 
ROE Energy 7 17.14 13.61 7.98 12.27 34.36 2.198 .006 
 Health care 12 29.97 24.37 26.93 7.91 109.43 2.645 .003 
 Industrials 14 44.21 34.20 33.01 17.65 120.51 1.830 .011 
 Information technology 16 26.28 20.09 30.13 –31.47 102.65 1.089 .020 
 Utilities 7 23.12 15.90 18.83 11.78 64.94 2.425 .003 
ROIC Consumer discretionary 11 22.73 17.96 15.33 3.85 52.85 1.236 .003 
 Information technology 16 18.49 16.32 19.93 –16.11 80.51 1.851 .029 
ROA Health care 12 11.13 10.82 6.95 2.55 30.35 1.940 .003 
 Utilities 7 5.00 4.46 1.70 3.32 7.74 1.007 .049 
Profit Materials 5 1.57 7.45 17.03 –28.39 13.80 –2.050 .012 
z score Information technology 16 6.63 4.76 6.54 2.06 27.47 2.575 .003 
q ratio Financials 15 1.37 1.22 .29 .96 1.77 .192 .023 
 Health care 12 2.97 2.43 1.56 1.17 6.43 1.410 .007 
 Utilities 7 1.67 1.63 .20 1.45 2.10 1.769 .019 
2015 
Performance GICS industry n M Median SD Min. Max. Skewness 
Kol.–
Smirnov 
(p) 
CGP Industrials 14 80.93 84.82 13.97 39.00 92.90 –2.328 .033 
CEP Industrials 14 67.82 77.02 22.08 28.60 90.50 –.858 .030 
ROE Financials 15 16.28 15.92 4.86 9.64 23.89 .258 .037 
ROIC Energy 7 –3.26 –.82 5.93 –14.09 2.84 –1.254 .038 
 Information technology 16 17.88 15.35 19.43 –10.03 80.99 2.339 .001 
ROA Energy 7 –2.45 –.67 4.48 –10.45 2.37 –1.159 .045 
Profit Consumer staples 6 10.00 8.44 7.69 1.59 24.52 1.602 .041 
 Materials 6 3.08 7.85 17.75 –31.43 16.33 –1.964 .026 
z score Information technology 16 6.63 4.76 6.54 2.06 27.47 2.575 .003 
q ratio Consumer discretionary 10 3.02 1.87 2.45 1.33 9.17 2.077 .025 
  Industrials 14 2.31 1.81 .98 1.12 4.01 .614 .017 
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2016 
Performance GICS industry n M 
Media
n SD Min. Max. Skewness 
Kol.–
Smirno
v (p) 
CSRO Consumer discretionary 11 79.30 87.10 18.50 33.30 93.30 –1.977 .003 
CGP Information technology 15 77.90 85.90 21.60 31.10 100.00 –1.245 .045 
CEP Consumer discretionary 11 77.20 85.90 20.50 25.90 94.50 –1.836 .015 
ROE Consumer discretionary 11 45.10 36.10 28.10 20.30 117.10 1.952 .029 
 Information technology 14 28.10 20.80 20.90 .10 70.60 1.231 .009 
 Utilities 7 19.30 12.90 25.80 –10.20 73.60 1.793 .028 
ROIC Information technology 16 20.40 16.10 18.00 .00 81.30 2.801 .001 
 Utilities 7 4.40 4.90 3.40 –2.80 8.10 –1.851 .014 
ROA Information technology 16 11.70 10.50 7.10 .00 29.70 1.22 .006 
Profit Energy 7 –20.00 –.50 48.40 –128.80 6.00 –2.541 .001 
 Health care 12 16.00 9.80 15.10 1.10 48.90 1.157 .020 
 Information technology 16 16.40 14.20 16.80 –13.20 69.10 1.904 .020 
z score Information technology 16 6.60 4.80 6.50 2.10 27.50 2.575 .003 
q ratio Consumer discretionary 10 2.70 1.70 2.00 1.20 7.50 1.887 .020 
 Financials 15 1.30 1.20 0.30 1.00 1.70 .188 .018 
 Industrials 14 2.40 2.00 1.00 1.30 4.40 .805 .015 
2017 
Performance GICS industry n M Median SD Min. Max. Skewness 
Kol.–
Smirnov 
(p) 
CGP Industrials 14 73.91 85.13 22.81 12.70 91.80 –1.808 .014 
CEP Industrials 14 62.25 69.18 20.39 22.20 84.90 –1.015 .011 
 Information technology 15 84.23 86.08 14.38 40.50 99.20 –2.114 .027 
 Materials 5 63.51 75.00 33.73 5.30 92.40 –1.843 .035 
CSP Consumer discretionary 11 83.62 88.73 12.72 53.80 95.10 –1.723 .004 
 Industrials 14 69.60 81.71 22.65 21.90 91.70 –.772 .017 
ROE Consumer discretionary 11 41.90 38.51 21.23 18.94 89.45 1.459 .013 
 Utilities 7 25.38 15.30 26.73 10.59 85.53 2.563 .001 
ROIC Energy 7 –2.07 1.22 10.84 –25.24 7.58 –2.05 .040 
 Information technology 16 21.46 17.67 21.17 –18.15 61.75 .488 .014 
ROA Energy 7 –1.70 .97 9.09 –21.18 6.22 –2.076 .042 
Profit Consumer discretionary 11 5.56 4.36 9.81 –18.46 17.16 –1.355 .045 
 Consumer staples 6 10.10 11.26 4.24 1.71 13.10 –2.129 .013 
 Energy 7 –.93 7.21 33.65 –74.53 23.47 –2.272 .018 
 Financials 15 15.09 20.87 14.12 –18.45 28.86 –1.218 .044 
 Industrials 14 12.70 8.92 14.36 .98 47.96 1.930 .003 
z score Information technology 16 6.83 4.80 6.26 2.90 26.47 2.547 .002 
q ratio Information technology 16 3.03 2.28 1.72 1.29 7.46 1.681 .004 
Note. Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum; Kol. = Kolmogorov; CGP = corporate governance 
performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CSP = corporate social performance; CSRO 
= corporate social responsibility–overall; ESG = environmental, social, and governance criteria; ROE = 
return on equity; ROIC = return on investment capital; ROA = return on assets. 
 
The descriptive statistics for all performance variables by industry are constant for the 
communication service industry, resulting in their exclusion from the output. The negative 
skewness followed similar clustering patterns as those in Dataset A, including a relatively flat 
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distribution over all 4 years. CFP, q ratio, and z score maintained abnormal distribution for all 4 
years. I found 60 abnormal data points (n = 60) for Dataset B across 2014 to 2017. The 
information technology industry produced the most abnormal occurrences across all 4 years 
(n = 15), as well as the most occurrences in 2016 (n = 6). The fewest occurrences across all 
industries occurred in 2015 (n = 11), and the most occurred in 2017 (n = 18).  
I used the Friedman test to determine changes in year-over-year performance across all 4 
years. The results of this test in Table 11 indicate statistically significant differences in CSRO, 
CSP, CGP, and q ratio from 2014 to 2015. The year-over-year change is defined as significant if 
the asymptotic significance value is less than .005. For each of these performance measures, the 
asymptotic value meets this requirement (CSRO = .029, CSP = .002, CGP = .010, and q 
ratio = .002). The significant change in the significance value also manifests in mean rank and 
median values from one year to the next.  
The change in mean rank decreased more than .50 for CSRO, CSP, CGP and q ratio from 
2014 to 2015. For q ratio, a second significant difference occurred from 2016 to 2017. The 
asymptotic significance value of .002 resulted in a .35 decrease in mean rank for these years. Per 
Pallant (2016), the next step in this analysis is to determine the effect sizes of the changes. I 
performed the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (using Bonferroni-adjusted α = .025) to determine the 
effect size of each significant change. 
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Table 11. Friedman Test Results After Significant Changes 
CSRO CSP 
Year M rank Median ∆ rank ∆ median Year M  rank Median ∆ rank ∆ median 
2014 2.82 81.803   2014 2.92 78.593   
2015 2.30 78.378 0.52* 3.43 2015 2.40 74.973 0.52* 3.62 
2016 2.48 80.354 (0.18) (1.98) 2016 2.42 75.761 (0.02) (0.79) 
2017 2.40 77.442 0.08 2.91 2017 2.27 72.375 0.15 3.39 
Asymptotic significance = .029 Asymptotic significance = .002 
          
CGP q ratio 
Year M rank Median ∆ rank ∆ median Year M  rank Median ∆ rank ∆ median 
2014 2.85 79.367   2014 2.69 1.832   
2015 2.27 75.741 0.58* 3.63 2015 2.13 1.730 0.56* 0.10 
2016 2.52 78.996 (0.25) (3.26) 2016 2.41 1.849 (0.28) (0.12) 
2017 2.37 78.661 0.15 0.33 2017 2.76 1.908 (0.35)* (0.06) 
Asymptotic significance =.010 Asymptotic significance =.002 
Note. CGP = corporate governance performance; CSP = corporate social performance; CSRO = corporate 
social responsibility–overall. 
* There is a statistically significant difference in the group. 
 
An inspection of CSRO, CGP, CSP and q ratio medians using the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test shows medium effect sizes (rs = 0.38, 0.35, 0.35, and 0.33, respectively) for the first set of 
differences and a small effect size (r = 0.26) for the second q ratio difference. The results in 
Table 12 indicate a statistically significant reduction (p < .005) from one year to the next and 
support the previous findings from the Friedman test. To determine if a specific group drives the 
changes, I performed a Mann–Whitney U test for CSRO, CGP, CSP and q ratio by CEO gender. 
I included the mean and median scores in the table for analysis. 
The Mann–Whitney U test results presented in Table 13 reveal significant differences in 
the CSP of males and females for 2014 (p = .026) and 2015 (p = .034) with small effect sizes. 
Although the significant difference is limited to CSP, the median value for female is higher for 
all tested variables. This indicates that women were the drivers of the changes. The small effect 
may be due to the small sample size and is an area of interest targeted for future research.  
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Table 12. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Friedman Test) Results 
  
2014 to 2015 
CSRO 
2014 to 2015 
CGP 
2014 to 2015 
CSP 
2014 to 2015  
q ratio 
2016 to 2017  
q ratio 
z –3.779 –3.452 –3.426 –3.255 –2.546 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 
Oldest year median 81.803 79.367 78.593 1.832 1.849 
Newest year median 78.378 75.741 74.973 1.730 1.908 
Total cases (n) 97 97 97 97 98 
Effect size (r) 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.26 
Note. Asymp. sig. = asymptotic significance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; CGP = 
corporate governance performance; CSP = corporate social performance. 
* There is a statistically significant difference in the group. 
 
Table 13. Mann–Whitney U Test (Friedman Test) Results 
CEO gender 
2014  
CSRO 
2014  
CGP 
2014 
CSP 
2014  
q ratio 
2015  
CSRO 
2015  
CGP 
2015  
CSP 
2015  
q ratio 
2016  
q ratio 
2017  
q ratio 
Male           
 
n 93 93 93 92 92 92 92 92 93 93 
Median 80.77 79.79 77.58 1.80 77.78 75.74 74.15 1.71 1.74 1.91 
Female           
 
n 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Median 97.03 84.62 93.18 2.39 80.65 87.90 93.26 2.31 2.53 2.27 
z –1.946 –0.315 –2.220 –1.207 –1.738 –0.049 –2.121 –1.664 –1.719 –1.267 
Significance 0.052 0.753 0.026* 0.227 0.082 0.961 0.034* 0.096 0.086 0.205 
Effect size (r) 0.197 0.032 0.224 0.123 0.176 0.005 0.215 0.169 0.174 0.128 
Note. CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; CGP = corporate governance performance; CSP = 
corporate social performance. 
* There is a statistically significant difference in the group. 
 
I performed a second Mann–Whitney U test to include the ESG performance, CSRO, and 
CFP variables along with the firm performance variables to determine if there are significant 
changes due to CEO gender. The results presented in Table 14 reveal significant differences 
between CEO gender in 2014 for CSP (p = .026) and again in 2015 for CSP (p = .034) and ROE 
(p = .022). Although the female medians are higher, the differences had small effect sizes 
(rs = .224, .215, and .233). The table also shows that male CEOs have higher medians than 
female CEOs for 2017. CGP, profit, and z score also have small effect sizes.  
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Table 14. Mann–Whitney U Test Results (CEO Gender) 
    2014 2015 2015 2017 2017 2017 
CEO gender CSP CSP ROE CGP Profit z score 
Male       
 n 93 92 91 92 94 77 
 Median 77.58 74.15 21.38 80.10 9.58 3.87 
Female       
 n 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 Median 93.18 93.26 70.36 76.19 7.27 3.51 
Total       
 n 98 97 96 97 99 82 
 Median 78.59 75.56 21.86 78.87 9.55 3.85 
z –2.220 –2.121 –2.284 –0.441 –0.799 –0.572 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed) 0.026* 0.034* 0.022* 0.660 0.424 0.568 
Effect size (r) 0.224 0.215 0.233 0.045 0.080 0.063 
Note. Asymp. sig. = asymptotic significance; CSP = corporate social performance; ROE = return on 
equity; CGP = corporate governmental performance.  
* There is a statistically significant difference in the group. 
 
Although the median scores for male CEOs are higher for CGP, profit, and z score 
(medians = 80.10, 9.58, and 3.87, respectively), the results are not significant (ps = .660, .424, 
and .568, respectively). I used the Kruskal–Wallis test to determine differences across the C-suite 
and board of director groups based on four categories: greater than 75%, 51–75%, 26–50%, and 
25% or less. The results reveal significant differences among the four categories for female C-
suites, male C-suites, and male boards of directors. The test also reveals differences in the eight 
category groups as described in Table 5 previously for a combination of female presence. Table 
15 contains the summary of differences, the year of occurrence, and the category group 
responsible. 
The Kruskal–Wallis differences indicate that female C-suites produced significant results 
(p < .05) for ROE in 2014, 2015, and 2016, whereas male C-suites produced significant results 
for ROE, ROIC, and ROA in 2014. Male board of directors produced significant results in 2017 
for z score, and women CEOs with female board member presence greater than 33% produced 
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significant results for ROE and ROIC in 2015. Correlation testing provided complementary 
results to all other testing and additional insights on the relationships between variables. 
Table 15. Kruskal–Wallis Test Results (Gender of C-Suite and Board of Directors) 
Female C-suite 
 Year n M SD Min. Max. Median Sig. χ
2 Median  Highest ranking 
ROE 2014 98 31.03 31.67 –31.47 206.20 22.02 0.044 6.226 60.08 26 to 50% repr. 
ROE 2015 96 32.36 47.34 –26.30 332.60 21.86 0.350 6.705 60.31 26 to 50% repr. 
ROE 2016 96 34.29 51.88 –20.55 380.31 21.20 0.044 6.231 73.00 51 to 75% repr. 
Male C-suite 
 Year n M SD Min. Max. Median Sig. χ
2 Median  Highest ranking 
ROE 2014 98 31.03 31.67 –31.47 206.20 22.02 0.003 11.744 62.83 51 to 75% repr. 
ROIC 2014 98 14.74 14.06 –16.11 80.51 11.37 0.012 8.878 60.93 51 to 75% repr. 
ROA 2014 98 8.97 7.30 –9.03 30.35 7.55 0.019 7.958 60.33 51 to 75% repr. 
ROIC 2017 99 14.03 14.41 –25.24 61.75 10.91 0.030 6.996 94.50 26 to 50% repr. 
Male board of directors 
 Year n M SD Min. Max. Median Sig. χ
2 Median  Highest ranking 
z score 2017 82 4.28 3.56 0.36 26.47 3.85 0.013 8.691 48.88 51 to 75% repr. 
Female presence 
 Year n M SD Min. Max. Median Sig. χ
2 Median  Highest ranking  
ROE 2015 96 32.36 47.34 –26.30 332.60 21.86 0.026 12.777 94.00 
Female CEO, at 
least 33% 
female directors, 
and less than 
33% female 
executives 
ROIC 2015 98 13.80 14.81 –14.09 80.99 11.58 0.041 11.561 97.00 
Female CEO, at 
least 33% 
female directors, 
and less than 
33% female 
executives 
Note. Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum; repr. = representation of women; CEP = corporate 
environmental performance; ROE = return on equity; ROIC = return on investment capital; ROA = return 
on assets. 
 
To support the nonparametric test results, I created a Spearman’s rho correlation (see 
Appendix E for descriptive statistics). The significant relationships presented in Table 16 are a 
mixture of positive and negative relationships across all variables and leadership categories. 
Differences also exist between the number of leaders represented in a certain category and the 
percentages for the same category.  
 60 
Table 16. Correlations of Significant Relationships 
ESG, CSRO, and financial performance  Firm performance 
Variable Year Performance Sig.  Variable Year Performance Sig. 
     Female C-suite 2014 z score .270* 
CEO gender 2015 CSP .216*  n 2015 z score .265* 
 2015 ROE .234*   2016 z score .235* 
       2017 z score .247* 
Female C-suite 2016 CEP –.225*    2014 ROE .602** 
n 2016 CSP –.310**  q ratio 2014 ROIC .614** 
 2016 CSRO –.274**   2014 ROA .669** 
 2017 CSP –.237*   2014 Profit .241* 
  2017 CSRO –.214*   2015 ROE .598** 
Female C-suite 2014 ROE .267**   2015 ROIC .628** 
% 2014 ROIC .232*   2015 ROA .704** 
 2014 ROA .232*   2015 Profit .209* 
 2015 ROE .236*   2016 ROE .587** 
 2016 ROIC .207*   2016 ROIC .604** 
 2017 ROE .311**   2016 ROA .710** 
  2017 ROIC .217*   2016 Profit .227* 
Male C-suite 2014 ROE –.250*   2017 CEP .253* 
# 2014 ROIC –.230*   2017 CSP .213* 
 2014 ROA –.237*   2017 CSRO .208* 
 2016 ROE –.274**   2017 ROE .486** 
 2016 ROIC –.204*   2017 ROIC .564** 
  2017 ROE –.263*   2017 ROA .653** 
Male C-suite 2014 ROE –.267**    2014 CEP .235* 
% 2014 ROIC –.232*  z score 2014 ROE .379** 
 2014 ROA –.232*   2014 ROIC .633** 
 2015 ROE –.236*   2014 ROA .642** 
 2016 ROE –.279**   2015 CEP .242* 
 2016 ROIC –.207*   2015 ROE .437** 
 2017 ROE –.311**   2015 ROIC .668** 
  2017 ROIC –.217*   2015 ROA .698** 
Female board 2014 CEO .253*   2015 Profit .336** 
n 2015 CEO .204*   2016 CEP .289** 
 2016 CEO .218*   2016 ROE .415** 
      2016 ROIC .660** 
       2016 ROA .691** 
Female board 2014 Profit .238*   2016 Profit .385** 
%      2017 CEP .267* 
       2017 ROE .392** 
Male board 2016 CGP –.203*   2017 ROIC .630** 
n 2016 q ratio –.217*   2017 ROA .656** 
  2017 ROIC –.202*    2017 Profit .280* 
Note. CSP = corporate social performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CGP = corporate governance performance; 
CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; ROE = return on equity; ROIC = return on investment capital; ROA = return on assets. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).                                                                                                                                                            
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
For example, the percentage representation of female C-suite with ROE, ROIC, and ROA 
are significant across all reporting years. The values ranging from .217 to .311 are significant at 
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the .05 and .01 levels, as indicated. Although these results are consistent with the Kruskal–Wallis 
test, the number of female C-suite positions shows a significant correlation only with ROE for 
2014. It is peculiar that the percentage of female C-suite yields significant results for ROIC and 
ROA but the number of female C-suite does not.  
Firm performance shows numerous significant results across all CFP variables for all 
years. Female board of directors has a positive relationship with CEO gender from 2014 to 2016. 
The nature of this relationship is an interesting discovery and an area targeted for future research. 
The correlation summary above provides details about significant relationships between 
variables. The summary in Table 17 focuses on the directional impact (positive and negative) of 
independent variables on dependent variables. 
Table 17. Correlations of Directional Impact 
Positive Occurrences  Negative Occurrences 
Performance CEO 
Female 
board 
Male 
board 
Women 
C-suite 
Male 
C-
suite  Performance CEO 
Female 
board 
Male 
board 
Women 
C-suite 
Male 
C-
suite 
CSRO 4 8 0 2 2  CSRO 0 0 8 6 6 
CGP 1 6 2 4 0  CGP 3 2 6 4 8 
CEP 4 7 2 3 4  CEP 0 1 6 5 4 
CSP 4 1 3 1 4  CSP 0 7 5 7 4 
ROE 4 5 1 8 0  ROE 0 3 7 0 8 
ROIC 4 3 2 8 0  ROIC 0 5 6 0 8 
ROA 4 0 4 7 0  ROA 0 8 4 1 8 
Profit 2 4 5 3 6  Profit 2 4 3 5 2 
z score 0 8 0 7 4  z score 4 0 8 1 4 
q ratio 4 4 2 4 4  q ratio 0 4 6 4 4 
Total 31 46 21 47 24  Total 9 34 59 33 56 
 Note. CGP = corporate governance performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CSP = 
corporate social performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; ESG = environmental, 
social, and governance criteria; ROE = return on equity; ROIC = return on investment capital; ROA = 
return on assets. 
 
The values in Table 17 represent the number of positive and negative correlations as 
presented in the Spearman Rho correlations for all independent and dependent variables. The 
number presented does not consider the strength or weakness of the relationship. The results for 
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CEO gender indicate that 84% of the 32 occurrences that took place between 2014 and 2017 are 
directionally positive for CSRO, ESG performance, and CFP. The total number of occurrences 
for board of director and C-suite increased to 64, as it included both the percentage and the 
number of representations for male and female.  
Female directors’ impact is 53% positive, and female C-suite members’ impact is 56% 
positive, thus outperforming their male counterparts (30% and 25%, respectively). CEO gender 
positive impact on firm performance represented 50% of the eight occurrences between 2014 and 
2017. Although the overall CEO impact is positive, Appendix E illustrates positive correlations 
to q ratio and negative correlations to z score. The nature of this relationship is a target area for 
future research. The total number of occurrences for boards of director and C-suites is 16 for this 
analysis. The results show that female board of director impact is 75% and that the female C-
suite impact is 69%, thus outperforming their male peers (13% and 50%, respectively). 
The final correlation summary (Table 18) illustrates the relationships among CSRO, ESG 
performance, CFP, and firm performance variables (z score and q ratio). The table consists of 
mostly positive relationships at 97%, with two negative relationships with CSP for z score in 
2014 and 2016. Of the 97% positive relationship status, nearly 73% indicate significant 
relationships at the .01 and .05 levels. As this is an unprecedented study, I relied upon test results 
to provide enough evidence to support the goals presented and to highlight the need for future 
longitudinal research on corporate sustainability. In the next section, I review these results 
through the lens of the holistic concentric circles model to answer the hypothesis questions. 
Table 18. Correlations of Firm Performance 
  
  2014 2015 2016 2017 
Performance  z score q ratio  z score q ratio  z score q ratio  z score q ratio 
CSRO 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.138 0.142 0.157 0.115 0.183 0.181 0.175 .208* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.219 0.166 0.163 0.267 0.105 0.077 0.121 0.042 
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 N 81 97 80 96 80 96 80 96 
CGP 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.046 0.078 0.027 0.021 0.114 0.092 0.07 0.138 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.685 0.445 0.813 0.84 0.315 0.371 0.535 0.181 
 N 81 97 80 96 80 96 80 96 
CEP 
Correlation 
Coefficient .235* 0.112 .242* 0.155 .289** 0.172 .267* .253* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.035 0.274 0.031 0.133 0.009 0.094 0.017 0.013 
 N 81 97 80 96 80 96 80 96 
CSP 
Correlation 
Coefficient -0.057 0.076 0.041 0.114 -0.001 0.172 0.081 .213* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.613 0.457 0.719 0.269 0.992 0.094 0.472 0.037 
 N 81 97 80 96 80 96 80 96 
ROE 
Correlation 
Coefficient .379** .602** .437** .598** .415** .587** .392** .486** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 N 81 97 79 95 79 95 78 94 
ROIC 
Correlation 
Coefficient .633** .614** .668** .628** .660** .604** .630** .564** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 N 81 97 81 97 82 98 82 98 
ROA 
Correlation 
Coefficient .642** .669** .698** .704** .691** .710** .656** .653** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 N 81 97 81 97 82 98 82 98 
Profit 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.147 .241* .336** .209* .385** .227* .280* 0.127 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.189 0.017 0.002 0.04 0 0.024 0.011 0.213 
 N 81 97 82 97 82 98 82 98 
Z-Score 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1 .429** 1 .465** 1 .524** 1 .586** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 
 N 82 80 82 80 82 81 82 81 
Q-Ratio 
Correlation 
Coefficient .429** 1 .465** 1 .524** 1 .586** 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 
  N 80 97 80 97 81 98 81 98 
 Note. Corr. = correlation coefficient; CSP = corporate social performance; CEP = corporate environmental 
performance; CGP = corporate governance performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; ROE = 
return on equity; ROIC = return on investment capital; ROA = return on assets.  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).                                                                                                                                                            
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 Hypotheses 
The holistic concentric circles model leverages investor value and community welfare to 
assign equal consideration of financial (CFP) and ESG performance constructs (CEP, CSP, 
CGP), thus creating a holistic view of stakeholder valuation (CSRO). The four-diamond 
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approach illustrates the freedom of leadership to address each construct in any combination per 
the vision and priority of the CSR initiative and organizational vision. The literature shows a 
direct relationship between improving sustainability and improving firm performance. If the 
empirical evidence is sound, the results of the study will reflect differences in sustainability 
results and correlational relationships to firm performance when controlling for gender and 
moderated by GICS industry. 
Hypothesis 1 states that CEO gender has a positive impact on year-over-year corporate 
sustainability. The significant differences between gender groups for CSRO, CGP, CSP, and q 
ratio using the Friedman test produced a reduction in scores from 2014 to 2015. The correlation 
summary in Table 16 indicates that CEO gender had a significant positive relationship with CSP 
(p = .216) and ROE (p = .234) in 2015. The correlation summary in Table 17 indicates that 
CEOs created a positive impact 84% of the time across CSRO, ESG, and CFP. Of these 
occurrences, 11% are significant. The null hypothesis is rejected, and the positive impact is 
confirmed. 
Hypothesis 2 states that female CEOs have a more positive impact than male CEOs do on 
year-over-year corporate sustainability. The results of the second Mann–Whitney U test (Table 
14) indicate higher median values for female CEOs across all years and variables excluding 2017 
CGP and profit. The following two tables provide additional evidence of female CEO impact on 
performance variables for Dataset A and Dataset B.  
Table 19 contains the 2017 average scores (excluding CFP) for each performance 
variable by industry and CEO gender for Dow Jones and Sustainalytics. The results for both 
organizations are consistent with those of the Mann–Whitney U test. Women produced higher 
ESG and CSRO performance scores than men did. Graphical illustrations of the Dataset A 
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results are presented in Figure 8. Table 20 contains 2014 to 2017 average scores for 
Sustainalytics CSRO and ESG performance by industry and gender. Female CEOs had higher 
impact than male CEOs in terms of year-over-year scores in 67% of occurrences. Graphical 
illustrations of Dataset B results are presented in Appendix D. The findings are consistent, and 
the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 19. CEO Impact on Overall and Component Performance by Industry, Dataset A  
2017 
  Dow Jones Sustainalytics 
Performance GIC Industry Women Men Women Men 
CSRO Consumer staples X  X  
 Industrials X  X  
 Information technology  X X  
 Utilities  X X  
CEP Consumer staples X  X  
 Industrials X  X  
 Information technology X  X  
 Utilities X   X 
CSP Consumer staples X  X  
 Industrials  X X  
 Information technology X   X 
 Utilities X  X  
CGP Consumer staples X   X 
 Industrials X  X  
 Information technology  X  X 
  Utilities X   X   
 Note. CSP = corporate social performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CGP = 
corporate governance performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall 
 
 
Table 20. CEO Impact on Overall and Component Performance by Industry, Dataset B 
    Women Men 
Performance GIC Industry 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 
CSRO Consumer staples X X X X     
 Industrials X X X X     
 
Information 
technology X X X X     
 Utilities X X X     X 
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CEP Consumer staples X X X X     
 Industrials X X X X     
 
Information 
technology X X X X     
 Utilities X X     X X 
CSP Consumer staples X X X X     
 Industrials X X X     X 
 
Information 
technology X X X X     
 Utilities X X X X     
CGP Consumer staples X X     X X 
 Industrials X X X X     
 
Information 
technology     X X X X 
 Utilities X X X X     
ROE Consumer staples  X   X  X X 
 Industrials X X X -    - 
 
Information 
technology X X X X     
 Utilities     X X X X 
ROIC Consumer staples     X X X X 
 Industrials X X X X     
 
Information 
technology X X X     X 
 Utilities X X X     X 
ROA Consumer staples     X X X X 
 Industrials X   X  X X  
 
Information 
technology X X     X X 
 Utilities  X X  X   X 
Profit Consumer staples  X  X X  X  
 Industrials   X  X X  X 
 
Information 
technology  X   X  X X 
 Utilities X X X     X 
          
q ratio Consumer staples     X X X X 
 Industrials X X X X     
 
Information 
technology X X X     X 
 Utilities X X X X     
 z score Consumer staples     X X X X 
 Industrials     X X X X 
 
Information 
technology     X X X X 
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  Utilities X X X X         
Note. CSP = corporate social performance; CEP = corporate environmental performance; CGP = 
corporate governance performance; CSRO = corporate social responsibility–overall; ROE = return on 
equity; ROIC = return on investment capital; ROA = return on assets. 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that female C-suite presence has a positive impact on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability. The significant differences among the four categories found using the 
Kruskal–Wallis test produced incremental increases in ROE scores from 2014 to 2016. The 
correlation summary in Table 16 indicates significant positive relationships between the 
percentage of female C-suites with ROE and ROIC (p = .207 to .311) for all years. However, an 
inverse relationship exists between the number of female C-suites with CSRO (p = –.214), CEP 
(p = –.225) and CSP (p = –.237) for 2016 and 2017. Although the correlation results are 
intriguing, the number of positive occurrences for all years is 56%. Of these occurrences, 13% 
are significant. The null hypothesis is rejected, and the positive impact is confirmed. 
Hypothesis 4 states that female C-suites have a more positive impact than male C-suites 
do on year-over-year corporate sustainability. The significant differences across the four 
categories found in Table 15 show ROE as the only performance variable shared between female 
and male C-suites using the Kruskal–Wallis test. The 2014 descriptive statistics are almost 
identical save the chi-squared value of significance (male: p = .003, median = 62.83; female: 
p = .044, median = 60.08). The chi values suggest that male C-suites with 51–75% representation 
have a higher influence on changes in 2014 ROE than female C-suites do with 26–50% 
representation. The females’ positive impact of 56% (Table 17) outweighed the males’ positive 
impact of 25%. None of these occurrences are significant. The null hypothesis is rejected, and a 
more positive impact is confirmed. 
Hypothesis 5 states that female board member presence has a positive impact on year-
over-year corporate sustainability. The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test did not yield any 
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significant differences among the four categories. The correlation summary in Table 16 indicates 
significant positive relationships between the percentage of female board of directors and profit 
(significance = .238*). The number of female board of directors did not yield any significant 
relationships with performance variables. The correlation summary in Table 17 indicates that 
women on boards of directors yield a positive impact of 53%. The null hypothesis is rejected, 
and the positive impact is confirmed. 
Hypothesis 6 states that female board member presence has a more positive impact than 
male-only board member presence does on year-over-year corporate sustainability. The Kruskal–
Wallis test did not present any findings on differences across the four category groups. The 
females’ positive impact of 53% (Table 17) outweighs the males’ positive impact of 30%. The 
null hypothesis is rejected, and a more positive impact is confirmed. 
Hypothesis 7 states that a positive relationship exists between year-over-year firm 
performance and corporate sustainability. Correlations in Table 16 and Table 18 indicate positive 
relationships between q ratio and z score across all variables and all years, excluding the z scores 
in 2014 (p = –.057) and 2017 (p = –.001). The positive relationships represent 97% of 
relationships, of which 73% are significant. The null hypothesis is rejected, and the positive 
relationship is confirmed. 
To gain additional insight into the effect of female presence, I performed the Kruskal–
Wallis test on the eight groups in Table 5, representing every combination of female leadership 
from 2014 to 2017. The results show that female CEOs with boards of directors that were at least 
33% female and C-suites that were less than 33% female produced significant changes in 2015, 
in terms of both ROE and ROIC. Table 21 contains the 4-year average scores for Sustainalytics 
firm performance, by industry and gender. Female CEOs’ impact on year-over-year firm 
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performance exceeded that of their male counterparts in 47% of occurrences. For this variable, 
male CEOs outnumbered female CEOs by two. Graphical illustrations of these results are 
presented in Appendix D. 
Table 21. CEO Impact on Firm Performance by Industry, Dataset B 
  
  Women Men 
Performance GIC industry 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 
q ratio Consumer staples     X X X X 
 Industrials X X X X     
 Information technology X X X     X 
 Utilities X X X X     
 z score Consumer staples     X X X X 
 Industrials     X X X X 
 Information technology     X X X X 
  Utilities X X X X         
 
The correlation summary in Table 17 indicates that CEOs had a positive impact 50% of 
the time across the firm performance variables. Women on boards of directors had a positive 
impact 75% of the time, and women in C-suite positions did so 69% of the time. Both 
contributions outweighed those of their male peers for (boards of directors, 13%; C-suites, 50%) 
in the reporting period. These additional findings are consistent with previous metrics and 
contribute to the overall discussion of sustainability. In Chapter 5, I explore this discussion 
through the lens of theoretical and managerial implications.  
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 CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Researchers have found only limited links in terms of long-term effectiveness between 
corporate leadership gender and sustainability performance. This research is a year-over-year 
quantitative analysis that is meant to determine the relationships among corporate leadership 
gender, CFP, CEP, CSP, and CGP, as moderated by industry. I examined all corporate leadership 
positions (as CEO, in the C-suite, and on the board of directors) and incorporated the results into 
the holistic concentric circles model to propose a new view of sustainability performance that 
gives equal consideration to all constructs. 
The definition and scope of diversity have changed, and corporate leaders must leverage 
employees’ differences to ensure organizations’ generational longevity. New leaders who take 
position in an organization should have the focus and the drive that is needed to cultivate a 
culture of sustainability. Although past researchers (Accenture, 2014; Catalyst, 2016; Hernandez 
Bark et al., 2015; Kim & Starks, 2016; Vanderbroeck, 2010) and I have highlighted the 
underrepresentation of female leadership in the global market, the root cause is not definitive. 
To increase the number of opportunities for women in corporate leadership, researchers 
must provide evidence to support women’s success in leadership roles. Sustainability is an area 
of opportunity for increasing the number of women in corporate leadership. Corporate 
sustainability requires long-term relationships and trust between communities and stakeholders. 
This study’s literature review shows that women are more focused than men on building long-
term relationships. 
Researchers have suggested that communal behaviors are the underlying influence of this 
focus. Communal behavior demonstrates the intent of considering the needs of all stakeholders 
prior to deciding on a course of action. Researchers have also suggested that communal 
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behaviors originate from a combination of internal experiences (upper echelons theory) and 
external conditioning (social role theory). Upper echelons theory suggests that corporate leaders, 
and specifically CEOs, heavily influence organizational direction and the prioritization of 
stakeholder needs. The determining factors that develop a self-defining view of right and wrong 
as part of business strategies stem from demographic and heterogenic influences (Nielsen, 2009). 
Researchers on social role theory have suggested that the determining factors in the development 
of generalized expectations of right and wrong in ethics considerations are based on social 
training through the lens of gender stereotypes (Weyer, 2007).  
Both upper echelons theory and social role theory provide empirical evidence that is 
applicable to the differences in the male and female approaches to business-strategy development 
and the prioritization of ethical considerations in achieving overall corporate sustainability goals. 
I postulate that, to achieve long-term corporate sustainability goals, all stakeholder value—
including investor value and community welfare interests—must be considered. A complete 
analysis framed within the holistic concentric circles model, which includes CFP, CEP, CSP, and 
CGP outcomes, is required to create an overall holistic view of stakeholder valuation (CSRO).  
This study includes three research questions on corporate leadership gender’s impact on 
performance outcomes over a 4-year period. I selected a sample of 99 North American 
multinational and large corporations who participated in annual corporate sustainability 
assessments. I retrieved the Sustainalytics data for the longitudinal analysis from a secure 
Bloomberg terminal. The Dow Jones data are available only for 2017, so I did not include them 
in the longitudinal analysis. Instead, I conducted a comparative analysis of the 2017 
Sustainalytics and Dow Jones data for Dataset A; this is presented in Chapter 4 for additional 
insight. 
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 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The first research question is as follows: What impact does CEO gender have on year-
over-year corporate sustainability in North American organizations? To answer this question, I 
tested two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that CEO genders have a positive impact on year-
over-year corporate sustainability. The second hypothesis is that female CEOs have a more 
positive impact than male CEOs in terms of year-over-year corporate sustainability. The results 
show that, although CEOs have a positive impact on year-over-year sustainability performance, 
they caused significant negative changes in certain constructs between 2014 and 2015.  
A deeper dive into the results reveals that female CEOs caused a temporary decrease 
from 2014 to 2015 but outperformed their male peers across all years. These results are 
consistent with those of Jeong and Harrison (2017), who utilized upper-echelons theory and who 
found that female executives produced short-term negative performance but also long-term 
positive performance. These positive results include female CEOs’ ability to build better long-
term relationships (Glass et al., 2016) and develop higher quality interactions with stakeholders 
(Glick, 2011) than their male peers.  
The second research question is as follows: What impact does C-suite gender have on 
year-over-year corporate sustainability in North American organizations? To answer this 
question, I tested two more hypotheses. The third hypothesis is that the presence of female C-
suites has a positive impact on year-over-year corporate sustainability. The fourth hypothesis is 
that female C-suites have a more positive impact than all male C-suites in terms of year-over-
year corporate sustainability. The results show that female C-suites had a positive impact on 
year-over-year sustainability performance but companies with 26 to 75% female representation 
had significantly stronger CFP-variable increases during the 4-year reporting period.  
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The directional results show that C-suites with significant female representation 
outperformed mostly male C-suites by 31% across all years. As with the results for CEOs, these 
findings indicate that female TMT leaders are more likely than their male peers to produce 
positive long-term performance and high-quality stakeholder interactions. In upper echelons 
theory, these high-quality interactions are treated as personal reflective values that are linked to 
business-strategy development and ethical prioritization (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
The third research question is as follows: What impact does female board members have 
on year-over-year corporate sustainability in North American organizations? To answer this 
question, I tested two additional hypotheses. The fifth hypothesis is that the presence of female 
board members has a positive impact on year-over-year corporate sustainability. The sixth 
hypothesis is that boards with female members have a more positive impact than those with only 
male members in terms of year-over-year corporate sustainability. The results show that female 
board members had a positive impact on year-over-year sustainability performance but that their 
presence had no significant impact on any of the other variables during the 4-year reporting 
period.  
The directional results indicate that the female board members outperformed their male 
counterparts by 33% across all years. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies 
using social role theory, in which researchers identified a relationship between board diversity 
and corporate sustainability performance (Boulouta, 2012; Velte, 2016). Although the positive 
impact of female board members was not significant in this study, the number of female board 
members was strongly correlated to CEO gender. According to social role theory, this 
relationship suggests that, as more women enter CEO positions, the number of female board 
members will also increase (Kim & Starks, 2016).  
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To further examine the goal of increasing the number of women in leadership, I 
conducted an analysis to test the effects of combinations of women in various leadership roles 
(as CEOs, in the C-suite, and on the board of directors). The results show that female CEOs 
whose boards of directors have at least 33% female representation and those whose C-suites have 
less than 33% female representation are more likely than other CEOs to produce significant 
positive changes in year-over-year CFP performance. This simultaneous testing of the CEO, C-
suite, and director roles is unprecedented; however, the results support the findings of previous 
studies. For instance, some previous researchers have highlighted the effects of TMT (or C-suite) 
leadership composition on strategy and performance outcomes (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Hambrick, 2007) 
Bear et al. (2010) found that having more female board of directors is correlated with 
stronger corporate sustainability ratings and better stakeholder perceptions of the corporation. 
Strand (2014) explored the impact of C-suite leadership on sustainability, particularly in terms of 
strategic position and the pursuit of market opportunities. Li et al. (2016) expressed that it is 
important for CEOs to use their influence and position to improve sustainability and corporate 
performance. The number of women at the leadership level of a corporation clearly influences 
both its sustainability and its overall performance. 
To further solidify the importance of corporate sustainability, I tested a seventh 
hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between year-over-year firm performance and 
corporate sustainability. The results indicate the existence of a significant relationship for 97% of 
the variables across the 4-year period, which confirms what scholars have found in empirical 
studies regarding the pursuit of sustainability’s positive impact on overall firm performance 
(Feng et al., 2017; Mackey, 2005; McWilliams et al., 2006; Whalen, 2013).  
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Although this study’s evidence shows that the gender of CEOs, C-suite members, and 
directors impacts corporate sustainability, these results are not consistent across all performance 
outcomes, industries, and time periods. To gain clarity, I applied a holistic approach by 
quantifying the positive occurrences for the entire reporting period and testing the hypotheses. 
These results are shown in Table 22. The difference between female and male leaders’ 
effectiveness is not large; however, this may be due to the small sample size. 
Table 22. Results for the Hypothesis Testing of Dataset B 
Hypothesis Description Results 
1 CEO gender has a positive impact on 
year-over-year corporate sustainability. 
The current study showed CEOS produced positive correlations 
for 84% of occurrences across all years. 11% of occurrences was 
significant; the null hypothesis was rejected. 
2 Female CEOs have a more positive 
impact than male CEOs on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability. 
The current study showed Female CEOs maintained higher 
median values across all years and variables excluding 2017 CGP 
and profit. Females produced higher scores 67% of occurrences 
across all years.; the null hypothesis was rejected. 
3 Female C-suite presence has a positive 
impact on year-over-year corporate 
sustainability. 
The current study showed Female C-suite produced a positive 
impact 56% of occurrences across all years. 13% of occurrences 
was significant; the null hypothesis was rejected. 
4 Female C-suites have a more positive 
impact than male C-Suites on year-over-
year corporate sustainability. 
The current study showed Female C-suite produced a positive 
impact 56% of occurrences across all years while males produced 
25%; the null hypothesis was rejected. 
5 Female board member presence has a 
positive impact on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability. 
The current study showed Female board member presence 
produced a positive impact 53% of occurrences across all years. 
None of occurrences was significant; the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
6 Female board member presence has a 
more positive impact than male only 
board member presence on year-over-year 
corporate sustainability. 
The current study showed Female board member presence 
produced a positive impact 53% of occurrences across all years 
while males produced 30%; the null hypothesis was rejected. 
7 There is a positive relationship between 
year-over-year firm performance and 
corporate sustainability. 
The current study showed a firm performance produced a positive 
impact of 97% of occurrences across all years. 73% of occurrences 
was significant; the null hypothesis was rejected. 
 
In addition to the primary research focus, I developed four subsidiary goals for this study. 
The first goal is to present a concise literature review on the history, purpose, and value of 
sustainability. I achieved this goal by covering the evolution of sustainability from the inception 
of CSR in the early 19th century (Heald (1970) through the 2017 debate regarding stakeholder 
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advocacy (Freeman and Dmytriyev (2017). I discussed provocative topics such as Christian 
humanitarianism, the Pullman experiment, and high-profile social issues.  
The second goal is to provide meaningful contributions to the research on leadership 
gender, sustainability, and business ethics. I extended the research on these topics through a 
discussion of current legislation and industry standards. The third goal is to introduce a holistic 
analytical view that equally weights financial and nonfinancial performance. To achieve this 
goal, I introduced the holistic concentric circles model in the literature review (Figure 3); by 
applying this model, I produced an alternative view for the analysis of sustainability constructs. 
This approach allowed me the freedom to quantify the positive occurrences and thus provide 
additional support for the study’s statistical findings. 
The fourth goal is to identify sustainability as an area in which female leaders can 
provide a competitive advantage and to thus begin a new trend in the global research on female 
leadership and sustainability performance. The evidence from both the previous literature and 
this study’s longitudinal results indicates that, holistically, female leaders outperform their male 
peers. Thus, sustainability is an area in which female leaders have a competitive advantage over 
their male counterparts, at least in large multinational corporations.  
 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Sustainability leadership involves building trust and enforcing responsible interactions 
with people and the environment while also meeting stakeholder needs and promoting 
generational longevity (Elsaid, 2014; Glick, 2011; Idowu & Louche, 2011). Corporate 
sustainability provides the checks and balances that are needed to measure the performance 
outcomes of the overarching CSR principles. The benefits of CSR include reduced operational 
costs and increased corporate value.  
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Scholars have suggested that communal behaviors and community-engagement activities 
can provide a corporation with a holistic understanding of stakeholder needs, in addition to 
building brand equity and trust (Green & Cassell, 1996; Mattis, 1993). For instance, 20% of 
female directors of Fortune 500 companies are engaged in their communities (Burke, 1993), and 
female leaders traditionally exhibit communal behaviors (Eagly, 1987; Weyer, 2007). The results 
of this study provide statistical evidence that, over a 4-year period, female CEOs produced better 
environmental, social, and governance performance than their male counterparts within the same 
industry. This implies that female leaders are more effective than male leaders. 
This study’s results suggest that female CEOs build trust, enforce responsible 
interactions, and promote generational longevity. In addition, the results indicate that female 
CEOs who have at least 33% female representation on their boards of directors produce stronger 
financial performance than other CEOs. Based on the proposed holistic view of sustainability, 
this study’s literature review and empirical results support the legislative mandate of California 
Senate Bill 826 (SB-826_Corporations, 2018) by indicating that female leaders (CEOs, C-suite 
members, and directors) are beneficial to companies. 
In this study, I also briefly discuss four future research opportunities. The first 
opportunity relates to gender representation by industry (Figure 4). Four of these industries have 
similar numbers of corporations; it could be interesting to determine whether there are 
connections between industries’ consumer bases, number of corporations, and gender 
representation in corporate leadership. The second opportunity involves investigating the impact 
of the differences in measurement methodology between Sustainalytics and the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (Figure 7). It would be interesting to determine whether one methodology is 
more appropriate than the other when considering gender representation in corporate leadership. 
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The third opportunity relates to investigating the significant positive relationship between 
CEO gender and the number of female directors (Table 16). This study’s data indicate that 
female CEOs tend to have more female directors than male CEOs have. It would be interesting 
to explore the nature of this relationship by leveraging multiple combinations. The last 
opportunity relates to the relationship between CEO gender and firm performance. As illustrated 
in Table 18, CEO gender has a positive relationship with q ratio and a negative relationship with 
z score. This study’s results also indicate that there is a significant positive correlation between q 
ratio and z score, leaving room for an investigation of whether CEO gender mediates this 
correlation.  
Sustainability approaches continue to evolve as business models, strategies, processes, 
and reporting change to fit the needs of corporations and stakeholders. Organizations that are 
seeking to increase sustainability or financial performance, as well as those that seek to adopt the 
holistic concentric circles model, should thus include more female leaders on TMTs, as women 
are more likely than men to exhibit communal behaviors and bring active community 
engagement to corporate leadership positions. In addition to the previously identified 
opportunities, I recommend generally conducting more studies in the area of corporate leadership 
gender and sustainability.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Definitions 
Corporate environmental performance (CEP) is a set of measurable practices assigned to 
the top management team (TMT) based on policy, objectives, and targets 
(United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency, 2011). 
Corporate financial performance (CFP) is a set of measurable practices assigned to the 
TMT in order to assess revenues and profits according to accounting principles, objectives, 
targets, and risk assessments (Karlson, 2016) 
Corporate governance performance (CGP) is a set of measurable practices assigned to 
the TMT to provide strategy, objectives, and risk assessment for responsible use of resources 
(International_Federation_of_Accountants_Committee, 2003). 
Corporate social performance (CSP) is a set of measurable practices that are based on 
societal expectations and that the TMT is accountable for (Brockett & Rezaee, 2012). 
Corporate responsibility is a set of duties or obligations that a corporation must fulfill, 
based on societal expectations (Bendell, 2009). 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an overarching principle that aligns strategic 
business activities with societal expectations to ensure that a business is both profitable and 
ethically considerate (Brusseau, 2017). 
Corporate sustainability is a corporation’s ability to meet its current business needs 
without compromising future people’s ability to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). 
A responsible corporation is voluntarily committed to moral, legal, mental, or behavioral 
accountability (Bendell, 2009).  
Social role theory uses societal beliefs to define acceptable gender roles and assign value 
based on the characteristics of those roles (Koenig & Eagly, 2014). 
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Sustainable development principles exist within a dialectical concept that combines 
economics, social justice, environmental science and management, business management, 
politics, and law (Wilson, 2003). 
In sustainability leadership, an executive or TMT leader focuses on establishing 
bureaucratic structures, which are used to build formalized processes and key performance 
indicators and thus drive CSP outcomes (Strand, 2014). 
Upper echelons theory states that corporate performance is a reflection of the executive 
leaders’ personal perceptions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
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Appendix B: Example Sustainability Key Performance Indicators 
Table B1. Corporate Governance Performance 
Oversight  
 Number of board committees 
 Percentage of independent board members 
 Independence of board committees 
 Board diversity (in terms of ethnicity, sex, expertise, etc.) 
 Staggering of the board 
 Separation of the chair of the board and the CEO 
 Board accountability and liability 
 Number of board meetings 
 Number of board members 
 Percentage of insiders on the board 
 Number of audit-committee members 
 Number of audit-committee meetings 
 Number of audit-committee financial experts 
 Value of the directors’ stock options 
Management 
 Risk management 
 Codes of conduct and ethics 
 Executive compensation 
 Stock-based compensation 
 Dividend policy 
 Budget and performance evaluation 
 Earnings releases 
 Non-generally accepted accounting principles financial measures 
 Operational information 
 Quantitative analysis 
 Forward-looking data 
 Financial statements 
 Internal control over financial reporting 
 Executive performance-based pay 
 Ratio of executive compensation to average employee compensation 
 Number of risk events 
 Risk trends 
 Total risk exposure 
 Percentage of strategic objectives achieved 
 Number of internal control improvement initiatives 
 Number of regulatory or legal noncompliance events 
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 Frequency of compliance reviews 
 Coast of noncompliance 
 Management’s description of its long-term vision 
 Management’s perspective on strengths and weaknesses 
 Management’s perspective on opportunities and threats 
 Management’s financial and nonfinancial goals 
 Management’s description of the corporation’s overall strategy 
Compliance 
 Existence of a compliance board committee 
 Existence of an executive compliance officer 
 Instances of noncompliance with applicable rules, laws, regulations, and 
standards 
 Cost of compliance with applicable rules, laws, regulations, and standards 
 Whistle-blowing policies, programs, and procedures 
 Restatement of financial and nonfinancial reports 
Internal Auditing 
 Existence of the internal audit function 
 Audit-committee oversight of the internal audit department 
 Independence of the internal audit function 
 The audit committee’s appointment of a chief audit executive  
 Internal audit reports to the audit committee 
 Adequate resources for the internal audit department 
 Existence of an internal audit charter 
External Auditing 
 Ratio of non-audit-related fees to total audit fees 
 Audit quality 
 Auditor independence 
 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspection reports 
 Compliance with professional auditing, ethics, and quality-control standards 
 Audit-firm rotation 
Legal and Financial Advisors 
 Existence of in-house legal counsel 
 Quality of legal services 
 Analyst rating recommendations 
 Analyst forecast dispersion 
 Analyst forecast accuracy 
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Monitoring 
 Say on pay 
 Majority-voting system 
 Democracy among shareholders 
 Institutional investors’ ownership 
 Poison pills 
 Proxy-statement issues 
 Online shareholder voting 
 Process for nominating directors 
 Approval of major business transactions (mergers and acquisitions) 
 Ratification of external auditors 
Ethics 
 Donations and other social expenses 
 Description of social and other activities and projects 
 Diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives 
 Fair wages, contracts, and benefits for employees 
 Training and internal continuing education 
 Employee diversity (based on age, specialization, gender, ethnicity, etc.) 
 Number of employees, turnover, and hiring and firing procedures 
 Whistleblowing policies, programs, and procedures 
 Employee productivity 
 Employee satisfaction, competence, and commitment 
 Customer satisfaction, retention, and loyalty 
 Fair compensation 
 Truthful advertising 
 Fair suppliers, contractual relationships, and bargaining 
 Supplier satisfaction, retention, and commitment 
 Political activities 
 Business codes of conduct 
 Uniform and fair enforcement of business codes of conduct 
 Certification of compliance with business codes of conduct 
 Resolution of conflicts of interest 
 Compliance with applicable laws, rules, regulations, and standards 
 Compliance with best practices and norms 
 Promotion of core values of mutual respect, fairness, openness, honest, and trust 
 Enforcement of responsibility and accountability 
 Promotion of tolerance, acceptance, caring, and compassion 
Note. Adapted from Corporate Sustainability, by A. M. Brockett and Z. Rezaee, 2012, Hoboken, 
NJ, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 135–137, 176.  
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Table B2. Corporate Environmental Performance 
 Continuous replacement of nonrenewable and scarce resources 
 Disclosure of ecosystem changes 
 Disclosure of total energy consumed (in gigajoules) 
 Disclosure of total carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted (in metric tons) 
 Disclosure of risk exposure and damage from climate change 
 Disclosure of toxic chemical use and disposal 
 Efficient use of unconventional (renewable and nonrenewable) natural resources 
 Efficient use of recycled materials 
 Analysis and assessment of environmental profitability 
 Maximum efficiency in the use of scarce natural resources 
 Measurement of resource depletion 
 Minimal use of environmentally harmful materials and products 
 Prevention of negative impacts on ecosystems 
 Production and use of environmentally safe products 
 Promotion of environmental performance 
 Proper use of nonwaste technologies 
 Preservation of scarce natural resources (power and energy) 
 Preservation of the environment 
 Promotion of biodiversity 
 Proper disclosure of environmental litigation and other legal actions and claims, 
as well as related expenses 
 Proper disposal and cleanup of hazardous waste 
 Proper measurement and disclosure of carbon and greenhouse-gas emissions 
 Proper recycling of medical, construction, and other hazardous and 
nonhazardous waste 
 Reporting of total waste produced (in metric tons) 
 Reporting of total water consumed (in cubic meters) 
 Reprocessing and reuse of scarce resources 
 Use of alternative energy sources in place of fuel, oil, and gas 
 Utilization of organic foods 
 Utilization of green cleaning products 
 Utilization of renewable energy 
Note. Adapted from Corporate Sustainability, by A. M. Brockett and Z. Rezaee, 2012, Hoboken, 
NJ, John Wiley & Sons, p. 197. Copyright 2013 by John Wiley & Sons – Books. Adapted with 
permission. 
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Table B3. Corporate Social Performance 
 A reliable social safety net for low-income households 
 Access to appropriate health care 
 Access to education 
 Access to information exchange 
 Injuries and fatalities (including no-lost-time injuries) per million hours worked 
at the company 
 Customer satisfaction, retention, and loyalty 
 Social and ethical activities and projects 
 Diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives 
 Donations and other social expenses 
 Employee composition by professional category, age, ethnicity, and gender 
 Employee satisfaction, competence, and commitment 
 Poverty eradication and justified wealth distribution 
 Full employment 
 Improved purchasing power 
 Employee count, turnover rate, and hiring and firing procedures 
 Total payroll 
 Political freedom and human-rights protection 
 Culture-heritage preservation 
 Productivity (employee-added volume, sales, or value) 
 Consumer-rights protection 
 Training and internal education 
 Wages, contracts, and benefits (other than stock options) 
 Well-maintained national security 
Note. Adapted from Corporate Sustainability, by A. M. Brockett and Z. Rezaee, 2012, Hoboken, 
NJ, John Wiley & Sons, p. 151. Copyright 2013 by John Wiley & Sons – Books. Adapted with 
permission.  
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Table B4. Corporate Financial Performance 
 Operating cash flow 
 Current ratio 
 Quick ratio (acid test) 
 Burn rate 
 Net profit margin 
 Gross profit margin 
 Working capital 
 Current accounts receivable 
 Current accounts payable 
 Accounts payable turnover 
 Accounts payable process cost 
 Accounts receivable turnover 
 Inventory turnover 
 Budget variance 
 Budget-creation cycle time 
 Line items in budget 
 Number of budget iterations 
 Payroll headcount patio 
 Sales growth 
 Day of outstanding sales 
 Vendor expenses 
 Payment for error rate 
 Internal-audit cycle time 
 Finance error report 
 Return on equity 
 Debt-to-equity ratio 
 Cost of managing processes 
 Resource utilization 
 Total cost of financial function 
Note: Adapted from “29 Popular Financial KPIs for Your Financial KPI Dashboard,” by K. 
Karlson, Scoro, 2016, https://www.scoro.com/blog/financial-kpis-for-financial-kpi-dashboard. 
Copyright 2019 by Scoro Software. Adapted with permission. 
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Appendix C: Average Scores by Industry 
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Figure C1. The list of panels represents the average scores for CSRO, ESG, CFP, and firm 
performance by industry, 2014 through 2017.  
Panel a) are the CSRO averages in each year; b) are the CGP averages in each year. c) are the 
CEP averages in each year. d) are the CSP averages in each year. e) are the ROE averages in 
each year. f) are the ROI averages in each year. g) are the ROA averages in each year. h) are the 
profit averages in each year. i) are the q ratio averages in each year. j) are the z score averages in 
each year. 
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Appendix D: Average Scores by CEO Gender and Industry 
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Figure D1. The list of panels represents the average scores for CSRO, ESG, CFP, and firm 
performance by gender and industry, 2014 through 2017.  
There are only four industries containing male and female CEOs. Panel a) are the CSRO 
averages in each year; b) are the CGP averages in each year. c) are the CEP averages in each 
year. d) are the CSP averages in each year. e) are the ROE averages in each year. f) are the ROI 
averages in each year. g) are the ROA averages in each year. h) are the profit averages in each 
year. i) are the q ratio averages in each year. j) are the z score averages in each year.
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Appendix E: Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables, 2014 through 2017 
Table E1. CEO Gender 
 
  
Performance 2014 2015 2016 2017
CSRO Correlation Coefficient 0.198 0.177 0.123 0.043
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.051 0.082 0.229 0.674
N 98 97 97 97
CGP Correlation Coefficient -0.032 0.005 -0.015 -0.045
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.755 0.961 0.884 0.662
N 98 97 97 97
CEP Correlation Coefficient 0.124 0.131 0.128 0.088
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.225 0.202 0.211 0.390
N 98 97 97 97
CSP Correlation Coefficient .225* .216* 0.190 0.065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026 0.033 0.063 0.527
N 98 97 97 97
ROE Correlation Coefficient 0.132 .234* 0.118 0.078
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.195 0.022 0.254 0.450
N 98 96 96 95
ROIC Correlation Coefficient 0.125 0.196 0.089 0.100
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.219 0.053 0.382 0.324
N 98 98 99 99
ROA Correlation Coefficient 0.091 0.153 0.040 0.065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.373 0.132 0.692 0.525
N 98 98 99 99
Profit Correlation Coefficient -0.032 0.102 0.013 -0.081
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.755 0.317 0.899 0.427
N 98 99 99 99
Z-Score Correlation Coefficient -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.064
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.571
N 82 82 82 82
Q-Ratio Correlation Coefficient 0.123 0.170 0.175 0.129
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.229 0.096 0.086 0.207
N 97 97 98 98
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Table E2. Female Board of Directors 
 
  
Performance % of Women on the Board # of Women on the Board % of Women on the Board # of Women on the Board % of Women on the Board # of Women on the Board  % of Women on the Board  # of Women on the Board
CSRO Correlation Coefficient 0.149 0.149 0.041 0.038 0.119 0.076 0.053 0.017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.147 0.146 0.688 0.711 0.244 0.459 0.603 0.872
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
CGP Correlation Coefficient 0.058 0.104 0.077 0.031 -0.021 -0.080 0.064 0.022
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.577 0.313 0.453 0.762 0.836 0.435 0.536 0.827
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
CEP Correlation Coefficient 0.14 0.163 0.068 0.103 0.119 0.119 0.006 -0.009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.175 0.112 0.508 0.315 0.244 0.246 0.952 0.931
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
CSP Correlation Coefficient 0.058 -0.004 -0.059 -0.120 -0.006 -0.058 -0.051 -0.093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.572 0.969 0.567 0.243 0.957 0.572 0.621 0.366
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
ROE Correlation Coefficient 0.014 0.006 -0.068 -0.090 0.020 -0.010 0.076 0.035
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.889 0.957 0.509 0.381 0.845 0.922 0.462 0.736
N 96 96 96 96 95 95 95 95
ROIC Correlation Coefficient -0.024 -0.059 -0.023 -0.065 0.056 0.012 0.058 -0.025
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.813 0.567 0.822 0.527 0.581 0.908 0.567 0.809
N 96 96 98 98 98 98 99 99
ROA Correlation Coefficient -0.042 -0.093 -0.062 -0.115 -0.062 -0.102 -0.009 -0.077
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.682 0.365 0.546 0.259 0.547 0.318 0.932 0.447
N 96 96 98 98 98 98 99 99
Profit Correlation Coefficient .238* 0.156 0.117 0.144 -0.081 -0.011 -0.053 -0.056
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.129 0.250 0.156 0.429 0.915 0.603 0.580
N 96 96 98 98 98 98 99 99
Z-Score Correlation Coefficient 0.076 0.037 0.050 0.048 0.084 0.076 0.145 0.098
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.507 0.747 0.660 0.668 0.455 0.500 0.195 0.380
N 79 79 81 81 81 81 82 82
Q-Ratio Correlation Coefficient 0.066 0.019 0.064 0.008 -0.008 -0.074 -0.040 -0.115
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.528 0.856 0.536 0.940 0.938 0.469 0.694 0.258
N 95 95 97 97 97 97 98 98
2014 2015 2016 2017
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Table E3. Male Board of Directors 
 
  
Performance  % of Men on the Board  # of Men on the Board  % of Men on the Board  # of Men on the Board  % of Men on the Board  # of Men on the Board  % of Men on the Board  # of Men on the Board
CSRO Correlation Coefficient -0.149 -0.015 -0.041 -0.004 -0.119 -0.150 -0.053 -0.186
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.147 0.882 0.688 0.971 0.244 0.143 0.603 0.068
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
CGP Correlation Coefficient -0.058 0.091 -0.077 -0.126 0.021 -.203
* -0.064 -0.196
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.577 0.376 0.453 0.220 0.836 0.046 0.536 0.055
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
CEP Correlation Coefficient -0.14 0.037 -0.068 0.069 -0.119 -0.025 -0.006 -0.081
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.175 0.721 0.508 0.504 0.244 0.806 0.952 0.431
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
CSP Correlation Coefficient -0.058 -0.109 0.059 -0.092 0.006 -0.111 0.051 -0.107
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.572 0.291 0.567 0.370 0.957 0.279 0.621 0.295
N 96 96 97 97 97 97 97 97
ROE Correlation Coefficient -0.014 -0.042 0.068 -0.069 -0.020 -0.076 -0.076 -0.110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.889 0.686 0.509 0.502 0.845 0.465 0.462 0.288
N 96 96 96 96 95 95 95 95
ROIC Correlation Coefficient 0.024 -0.123 0.023 -0.157 -0.056 -0.137 -0.058 -.202
*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.813 0.234 0.822 0.124 0.581 0.177 0.567 0.045
N 96 96 98 98 98 98 99 99
ROA Correlation Coefficient 0.042 -0.175 0.062 -0.190 0.062 -0.142 0.009 -0.156
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.682 0.088 0.546 0.062 0.547 0.164 0.932 0.122
N 96 96 98 98 98 98 99 99
Profit Correlation Coefficient -.238* -0.179 -0.117 0.059 0.081 0.141 0.053 0.053
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.081 0.250 0.564 0.429 0.166 0.603 0.604
N 96 96 98 98 98 98 99 99
Z-Score Correlation Coefficient -0.076 -0.145 -0.050 -0.049 -0.084 -0.098 -0.145 -0.169
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.507 0.202 0.660 0.665 0.455 0.386 0.195 0.130
N 79 79 81 81 81 81 82 82
Q-Ratio Correlation Coefficient -0.066 -0.145 -0.064 -0.155 0.008 -.217
* 0.040 -0.177
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.528 0.162 0.536 0.129 0.938 0.033 0.694 0.081
N 95 95 97 97 97 97 98 98
2014 2015 2016 2017
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Table E4. Female C-Suite 
 
  
Performance  % of Women Executives  # of Women Executives  % of Women Executives  # of Women Executives  % of Women Executives  # of Women Executives  % of Women Executives  # of Women Executives
CSRO Correlation Coefficient 0.039 -0.131 0.036 -0.088 -0.057 -.274
** -0.013 -.214
*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.707 0.199 0.729 0.393 0.582 0.007 0.898 0.037
N 96 98 97 97 97 95 97 95
CGP Correlation Coefficient 0.046 -0.063 0.142 -0.029 0.142 -0.089 0.067 -0.071
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.653 0.536 0.164 0.779 0.164 0.389 0.516 0.494
N 96 98 97 97 97 95 97 95
CEP Correlation Coefficient 0.039 -0.006 0.019 0.020 -0.060 -.225
* -0.070 -0.142
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.706 0.956 0.851 0.845 0.559 0.028 0.496 0.170
N 96 98 97 97 97 95 97 95
CSP Correlation Coefficient 0.026 -0.178 -0.094 -0.136 -0.126 -.310
** -0.040 -.237
*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.799 0.079 0.360 0.183 0.220 0.002 0.696 0.021
N 96 98 97 97 97 95 97 95
ROE Correlation Coefficient .267** 0.021 .236
* 0.087 .279
** 0.033 .311
** 0.063
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008 0.839 0.020 0.398 0.006 0.749 0.002 0.548
N 96 98 96 96 95 94 95 93
ROIC Correlation Coefficient .232* 0.042 0.189 0.085 .207
* 0.054 .217
* 0.107
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 0.68 0.062 0.407 0.041 0.602 0.031 0.297
N 96 98 98 98 98 97 99 97
ROA Correlation Coefficient .232* -0.001 0.150 0.049 0.155 0.070 0.128 0.093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 0.993 0.142 0.635 0.127 0.496 0.205 0.363
N 96 98 98 98 98 97 99 97
Profit Correlation Coefficient 0.102 -0.065 -0.001 0.164 -0.038 0.104 -0.046 -0.014
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.321 0.528 0.991 0.106 0.712 0.309 0.651 0.889
N 96 98 98 98 98 97 99 97
Z-Score Correlation Coefficient 0.098 .270* 0.084 .265
* -0.018 .235
* 0.033 .247
*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.391 0.015 0.457 0.017 0.875 0.036 0.771 0.027
N 79 81 81 81 81 80 82 80
Q-Ratio Correlation Coefficient 0.029 -0.051 0.029 -0.075 -0.006 0.017 -0.082 0.013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.777 0.623 0.775 0.466 0.957 0.869 0.423 0.902
N 95 97 97 97 97 96 98 96
2014 2015 2016 2017
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Table E5. Male C-Suite 
Performance  % of Men Executives  # of Men Executives  % of Men Executives  # of Men Executives  % of Men Executives  # of Men Executives  % of Men Executives  # of Men Executives
CSRO Correlation Coefficient -0.039 -0.061 -0.036 -0.043 0.057 -0.096 0.013 -0.112
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.707 0.552 0.729 0.678 0.582 0.354 0.898 0.279
N 96 96 97 97 97 95 97 95
CGP Correlation Coefficient -0.046 -0.04 -0.142 -0.133 -0.142 -0.191 -0.067 -0.131
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.653 0.699 0.164 0.194 0.164 0.064 0.516 0.204
N 96 96 97 97 97 95 97 95
CEP Correlation Coefficient -0.039 -0.035 -0.019 0.026 0.060 -0.052 0.070 0.014
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.706 0.738 0.851 0.801 0.559 0.620 0.496 0.892
N 96 96 97 97 97 95 97 95
CSP Correlation Coefficient -0.026 -0.066 0.094 0.048 0.126 -0.044 0.040 -0.123
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.799 0.522 0.360 0.641 0.220 0.673 0.696 0.233
N 96 96 97 97 97 95 97 95
ROE Correlation Coefficient -.267** -.250* -.236
* -0.178 -.279
**
-.274
**
-.311
**
-.263
*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008 0.014 0.020 0.083 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.011
N 96 96 96 96 95 93 95 93
ROIC Correlation Coefficient -.232* -.230* -0.189 -0.129 -.207
*
-.204
*
-.217
* -0.163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 0.024 0.062 0.206 0.041 0.046 0.031 0.110
N 96 96 98 98 98 96 99 97
ROA Correlation Coefficient -.232* -.237* -0.150 -0.106 -0.155 -0.140 -0.128 -0.082
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 0.02 0.142 0.300 0.127 0.174 0.205 0.427
N 96 96 98 98 98 96 99 97
Profit Correlation Coefficient -0.102 -0.102 0.001 0.126 0.038 0.082 0.046 0.035
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.321 0.324 0.991 0.215 0.712 0.426 0.651 0.735
N 96 96 98 98 98 96 99 97
Z-Score Correlation Coefficient -0.098 -0.01 -0.084 0.059 0.018 0.058 -0.033 0.061
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.391 0.929 0.457 0.602 0.875 0.610 0.771 0.590
N 79 79 81 81 81 79 82 80
Q-Ratio Correlation Coefficient -0.029 -0.054 -0.029 -0.053 0.006 0.006 0.082 0.079
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.777 0.606 0.775 0.606 0.957 0.957 0.423 0.447
N 95 95 97 97 97 95 98 96
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
2014 2015 2016 2017
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